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Abstract 
 This thesis suggests that agent-based modeling provides an effective way to understand 
and analyze the internal political dynamics of Pakistan. The first section describes Pakistan’s 
current situation and introduces a study published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
outlining five possible futures the nation could experience.  After stating the five futures, I 
hypothesize that agent-based modeling could enhance this study and provide arguments that 
social scientists use to justify this quantitative approach. The next portion of the thesis intricately 
describes all aspects of the model-building process. The experimentation process and metrics are 
then discussed and finally, the experiment results are compared with the CFR study on Pakistan. 
The thesis concludes that agent-based modeling provides a complementary, systematic and 
logical way to examine nations’ political futures. Rather than forecasting, agent-based models 
provide researchers with a palette of possible trajectories.  
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I. Introduction   
Pakistan is among the most complex nations in the world. The government lacks stability 
and has oscillated between military regimes and democratic civilian governments since its 
creation in 1947. In the past 10 years, Pakistan has experienced two different types of 
government structures and become more volatile and dangerous than ever before. The political 
turmoil within Pakistan hinders the country from progressing socially, economically or in any 
other capacity. To make matters worse, the nation faces other issues such as corruption, 
overpopulation, energy and water crises, a low per capita income and violence from terrorist and 
drone attacks. 
Despite its numerous challenges, Pakistan has held together as a nation and remains 
largely functional. On March 16, 2013, Pakistan’s civilian government completed its entire five-
year term without a military intervention for the first time in its history. Such accomplishments 
raise the question - will Pakistan continue on this path towards democracy or will the country 
veer towards a different trajectory? Answering this question is extremely important as the nation 
possesses nuclear weapons, maintains a weak civilian government and has terrorist organizations 
within its borders. All of these concerns suggest that an examination of the country’s internal 
affairs may provide a better understanding of possible trajectories. 
Founded after negotiations with the British Empire, Pakistan was created as a nation for 
Muslims residing within the Indian subcontinent. For decades after its formation, Pakistan lacked 
a constitution and strong political parties to create a precedent of civilian governance. Unable to 
recover from this unsound beginning, the country has experienced three military coups in its 65-
year history. To this day, Pakistan’s contentious relationship between civilian and military 
institutions has distracted officials from focusing on economic growth, education, healthcare 
PSCI 499 – Honors Thesis  Quratul-Ann Malik 
 8 
reform and other nation-building efforts. In addition to these issues, Pakistan remains enemies 
with its neighbor India. The consistent fear of going to war with India has encouraged the 
government to spend most of its budget on the military. All of these different but troublesome 
issues contribute to Pakistan’s current volatile state. Pakistan, therefore, is one of the most 
difficult countries to comprehend. However, understanding Pakistan remains an important issue 
not only for Pakistanis, but also for the international community. 
In recent decades, Pakistan has become increasingly vital to the United States. Although 
they remain allies, the two countries share a mutual distrust. The tension between the two nations 
has reached an all time high in the past three years. Drone strikes by the United States targeting 
terrorists in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas have angered the people and 
contributed to the decline of public opinion on the U.S 1 Terrorist organizations continue to 
retaliate by suicide bombing within Pakistan, targeting prominent Pakistani officials and people 
associated with the United States. Furthermore, the relationship recently worsened with 
consecutive contentious events including an increase in such drone strikes, the accidental killing 
of Pakistani soldiers by the U.S. military in a cross-border skirmish and secretly invading the 
country to capture Osama Bin Laden. These tense events have demonstrated the critical need to 
study and understand Pakistan.    
Although many scholars have attempted to study the country and predict outcomes using 
qualitative methods, this thesis attempts to understand and analyze Pakistan’s future by utilizing 
agent-based modeling.  
                                                          
1
 Out of Sight, Out of Mind: a Visualization of Drone Strikes in Pakistan since 2004. (2013).  
     Retrieved March 21, 2013, from http://drones.pitchinteractive.com  
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2. Possible Futures of Pakistan 
Pakistan’s future remains uncertain and many scholars have speculated possible 
trajectories. These trajectories can be seen in the Council on Foreign Relations’ study titled, 
“Crisis Guide: Pakistan.” This interactive website outlines five possible futures Pakistan could 
experience in the coming decades. These futures, titled “A State Adrift,” “An Authoritarian 
State,” “An Islamist State,” “A Moderate State” and “A Collapsed State,” reflect the general 
scholarship available on Pakistan’s prospects.  
The first scenario Pakistan could experience, “A State Adrift,” refers to the possibility 
that Pakistan will continue on its current path of political instability with broken political parties 
lacking ideological stances, weak civilian institutions penetrable by the military, corruption by 
officials and no nation building efforts. Such a scenario also involves no single institution 
dominating the nation. Author Kanti Bajpai adds to this by saying that this future is likely if 
separatists groups like those in Balochistan and Islamist organizations continue to lack strength 
in number, power and popular opinion to overcome the predominantly Punjabi military 
attempting to hold the country together. Pakistan “muddling through” may also include the 
government continuously “firefighting” issues as they arise rather than solving problems in the 
nation with a long-term strategy.2 
 A second scenario Pakistan may experience is a military coup. While history suggests 
that this outcome is possible, authors Aqil Shah, Kanti Bajpai, Shaukat Qadir, Stephen Cohen 
and others all believe this fate appears unlikely in the immediate future because of General 
Musharraf’s long and unsuccessful term as President of Pakistan. However, a military 
government could still occur in a few ways. If political parties “cross certain red lines” that are 
                                                          
2
 Qadir, S. (2011). Still an Uncertain Future. In S. Cohen (Author), The Future of  
Pakistan  (pp. 199-214). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 
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typically reserved for the military, this could anger military elites and lead them to retaliate. This 
future could also occur if internal violence becomes unbearable and the nation appears on the 
verge of collapse. 
Another scenario that Pakistan could experience is an Islamist government rising to 
power. Authors Bruce Riedel, Ahmed Rashid and Anatol Lieven cite this as an unlikely, but 
possible scenario. They imagine that this scenario could play out in three different ways. First, 
Pakistan could experience a military take over by a general holding similar worldviews to those 
of General Zia-ul-Haq who promoted Islamicization between 1980 and 1988. An extremist 
general may encourage army recruits from the same villages as the people in militant groups 
such as Lakshar-e-Tayiba.3 An Islamist government could also rise to power from an insurgent 
group victory. Such a scenario would be extremely difficult, and would require an increase of 
public support for the Taliban.4 With the increase of terrorism in the past 7 years, such support 
appears unlikely. A third scenario would involve an Arab Spring-like situation taken over by 
madrasa cohorts and well-armed militias.5 All three authors write that this outcome is unlikely, 
but still in the realm of possible futures.  
A fourth scenario referenced by many authors is a best-case scenario government in 
which a moderate and effective leader comes to power.   Scholars write that this scenario could 
occur if the person serving as the Prime Minister asserts themselves to solve problems of 
national security, food shortages, inflation, health care, education, job opportunities and much 
more. It may also require the Prime Minister to incorporate parts of the tribal areas into Pakistan 
in an effort to reduce the amount of terrorism. Another way this scenario could take place is if 
                                                          
3
 Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad. (2011). Washington, DC:    
Brookings Institution. 
4
 Rashid, A. (2012). Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and  
Afghanistan. New York, NY: Penguin Group. 
5
 Ibid, 203 
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political parties begin forming ideological platforms and institutions that allow for their survival 
beyond a family fiefdom. All of these political changes would need to be accompanied by some 
type of growth in the urban middle class interested in maintaining democracy and the military 
interested in remaining subordinate. 6 
Another outcome scholars include is a collapsed state. Scholars interpret a collapsed state 
as one in which the country can no longer remain a single entity and divides ethnically or 
religiously. Although this scenario remains unlikely, there are a few ways they envision such an 
outcome unfolding. If there was no leader who could unite the country, ethnic and religious 
divides may continue to grow.7 These divides may eventually evolve into an increase of violence 
or even civil war. This scenario also involves a weak Punjab province that cannot prevent a 
break up. Punjab is the most dominant province and without it, the country would be unable to 
remain together. Another way this future could occur is with the assistance of some outside 
nation.8 For example, in 1971, India successfully assisted a group of Pakistanis secede from the 
central government to form their own nation, Bangladesh. However, this future appears less 
likely than any of the others. Anatol Lieven writes,  
“with the exception of some of the Baloch who think that they would do well on the strengths of 
their gas and mineral reserves, very few political or intellectual groups in Pakistan and Pakistan’s 
provinces actually want to break the country up whether because they are genuinely attached to it 
(in the army, the bureaucracy and much of Punjab); because they hope to take it over and use it as 
a base for a wider programme (the Islamists); because they are afraid of Indian domination 
(Punjabis); because they are afraid that Pakistan’s break up would lead to a dreadful civil war 
with other ethnicities (The Sindhis and the Mohajirs), and even the Pathans, since the Hindko 
speaking minority in NWFP is strongly opposed to Pathan nationalism); or simply because the 
alternative looks so much worse (the Pathans, when they look across the border into 
Afghanistan). So one of the biggest factors holding Pakistan together is fear.”9 
 
                                                          
6
 Shah, 205 
7
 Bajpai, Kanti. (2011). Pakistan’s Future: Muddle Along. In S. Cohen (Author), The  
Future of Pakistan  (pp. 199-214). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 
8
 Ibid, 73 
9
 Lieven, A. (2011). Pakistan: A Hard Country. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. 
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This quote suggests that all groups vying for power in Pakistan are only doing so because they 
see opportunity in taking over the country as a whole. These people are less interested in a 
fragmented Pakistan and thus will try to keep the nation together.   
These five scenarios are summed up in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Crisis Guide: 
Pakistan study. The purpose of this thesis is to construct an agent-based model of Pakistan, titled 
“Virtual Pakistan 2013,” which closely examines the five proposed futures. The simulation 
examines the frequency of the proposed outcomes and discusses other possible trajectories of 
Pakistan that they did not include.  The next section discusses the value of agent-based modeling, 
then explains the model building processes and shares results from running the simulation. I 
hypothesize that Virtual Pakistan will provide a more useful way of examining the five possible 
futures and will exhibit more scenarios than those five listed. The following sections will test this 
hypothesis by explaining the model building process and comparing the experiment and results 
with those suggested by the CFR.   
3.  Agent based Modeling and Virtualizations  
Policymakers and academics constantly strive to discover the unknown. Mathematics 
opens the door for physical scientists to find the unknowns of physics, chemistry and biology. 
Similarly, political scientists strive to discover unknowns such as the likelihood of regime 
change, political identity dominance and economic instability. However, for such complex 
questions, mathematics remains unable to provide answers. Many political scientists have 
attempted to predict and forecast political phenomena through qualitative methods such as expert 
panels, while others have attempted to predict political phenomena through quantitative 
techniques including statistical modeling, rational choice theory, game theory and agent-based 
PSCI 499 – Honors Thesis  Quratul-Ann Malik 
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modeling. This section examines the pros and cons of the two types of modeling discussed in the 
paper: qualitative mental models as seen in the CFR report and agent-based models. 
3.1 Qualitative Modeling - Expert Panels   
Policymakers rely on expert panels when predicting political futures of nations. The 
Council on Foreign Relations’ report on Pakistan provides an example of such a panel. It serves 
as a platform on which multiple South Asia scholars discuss their thoughts on Pakistan’s political 
future. Ian Lustick’s “From Theory to Simulation” explains expert-panels’ rise to prominence in 
the 1970s when policymakers predicted possible consequences of the 1973 embargo.10 Many 
academics continue to favor this modeling method, as they believe it more accurately accounts 
for complex human behavior and regional culture than quantitative modeling. Area experts often 
consider nuances in a region’s political culture and can imagine scenarios in great levels of 
detail. From a proponent’s perspective, quantitative modeling, in an attempt to simplify 
complicated interactions, misses important unique qualitative concepts in the process.  
Despite the benefits of such mental models, there are many reasons why this method is 
not used in this paper. First, expert-panels are often subject to human emotions and biases.  
Scholars who understand the political and social fabric of a nation could unknowingly lean 
towards one political future because of their own internal biases. Philip Tetlock’s paper discusses 
that another flaw of qualitative modeling is that explanations with more detail or better rhetoric 
may appear more convincing.11 These unchecked issues may cause problems in examining a 
possible future of Pakistan. Qualitative models are also not conducive to examining rare or 
                                                          
10
 Lustick, I., Alcorn, B., Garces, M., & Ruvinsky, A. (2010). From Theory to Simulation:  
The Dynamic Political Hierarchy in Country Virtualization Models. Annual  
Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Retrieved from  
http://lustickconsulting.com/data/Theory%20to%20Simulation%20APSA%202010.pdf, pg1 
11
 Tetlock, P. (2005). Expert Political Judgement: How Good Is It? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University  
      Press. 
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unusual futures. Because area-experts are human, they are limited in their ability to think of all 
possible trajectories a nation could experience. A computer model, which accounts for 
randomness in the real world, generates hundreds or thousands of additional futures that a human 
expert may accidentally neglect to consider. The CFR’s report, as will be discussed later in the 
paper, provides five unique and interesting possible futures but leaves out other possible 
outcomes and provides no justification for why these five should be considered more plausible 
than other scenarios.  
3.2 Defining Agent-based Modeling  
Agent-based models consist of autonomous units, or agents, whose micro interactions 
impact macro behavior. “Rules,” based on political theory, govern these micro interactions. For 
example, if the theory claims that groups alienated from the government will protest, the 
researcher creates a rule calculating which groups lack connection to the government and 
increases their propensity to act violently. Agent-based simulations, when analyzing political, 
social or economic situations, incorporate census data, survey data and qualitative information to 
combine elements of the real world. Applying rules and data to the agents, agent-based models 
produce different trajectories of possible futures. 
3.3 Agent-Based Modeling Evolution 
Agent-based models gained popularity after John Conway’s “Game of Life” model, in 
which four simple rules controlled the behavior of autonomous actors or “agents.” In his model, 
agents could be in one of two states of being – alive or dead. After creating and simulating “The 
Game of Life,” he concluded that the model evolved differently depending on the initial 
landscape. Agent-based modeling builds upon his initial idea as it uses rules to govern an agent’s 
state of being. These rules can be complicated or simple depending on the problem at hand. 
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  After John Conway’s initial model, Robert Axelrod, Lars Cederman, Robert Axtell, 
Josh Epstein and other scholars have built upon Conway’s work and used agent-based modeling 
to answer more complex questions in the social sciences and study patterns of emergence. Ian 
Lustick, specifically, has used agent-based modeling in an innovative way to study ethnicity and 
political identity.12 The agent-based model presented in this thesis, Virtual Pakistan 2013, uses 
Lustick’s assumptions that agent-based modeling can be utilized to examine questions of 
ethnicity and collective political identity.  
3.4 Benefits of Agent-Based Modeling  
 Agent-based models can effectively capture the political complexities of a nation like 
Pakistan for multiple reasons. Unlike qualitative models, the agent-based model can examine 
both extremely simple and complex political phenomena.  They also provide political researchers 
with the ability to account for bounded rationality, examine internal emergence, use systematic 
approaches when thinking about subjective matters, test “what if “ and hypothetical scenarios, 
allow visualizations of patterns in a spatial realm, and maintain a repeatable and recoverable 
process. Despite these benefits, agent-based models also have some limitations. The main 
limitation is that computer models are only as good as the data that is available and are full of 
unchecked assumptions. Another limitation of agent-based models is the lack of standardized 
modeling approaches.  
 Agent-based models have the ability to capture both complex and simple behavior. Miller 
and Page refer to the capability as their “flexibility and precision.” These simulations have the 
flexibility to incorporate rules in the computer coding that capture all of the various complexities 
                                                          
12
 Lustick, I. (2000). Agent-based Modeling of Collective Identity: Testing Constructivist Theory. Journal of  
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(1). http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/3/1/1.html  
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of the world, while still maintaining a high degree of precision.13  They have the capacity to 
represent both behavioral and environmental assumption in the model with little effort. Similarly, 
models can capture political, economic and social phenomena. In other words, models are 
extremely versatile.  Thomas Berger, when creating a model on the technological impact on 
agriculture, chose agent-based modeling because he could include both the technical and 
financial constraints in the rules. 14  Ian Lustick and Dani Miodownik also discuss the wide 
spectrum of agent-based models that can be created through modeling platform, PS-I.15 The three 
kinds of models referenced are titled Abstractions, Ensembles and Virtualizations. Abstract 
agent-based models test the simple interactions between agents by altering one or two parameters 
at a time, ensemble models test abstract theories while incorporating elements of the real world, 
and Virtualizations attempt to the model the specific political conditions occurring in a particular 
place and time. As will be explained below in the Dynamic Political Hierarchy section, Virtual 
Pakistan is a Virtualization that combines political, psychological and evolutionary 
understandings of the world. 
Agent-based models also store and usefully incorporate large amounts of data.  Berger 
writes that agent-based models allow users to “pragmatically treat the availability of data in 
transition and in developing country.”16 Virtual Pakistan, for example, uses census data, survey 
data and interviews to create and explain relationships between the multiple ethnic, religious, 
socio-economic and political party identities.  
                                                          
13
 Miller, John H. (2007) Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life.  
   Princeton: Princeton UP.  
14
 Berger, Thomas. "Agent-Based Spatial Models Applied to Agriculture: a Simulation Tool for Technology  
Diffusion, Resource Use Changes and Policy Analysis." Agricultural Economics 25 (2001): 245-60. 
http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/~rlr/CSCS530/uploads/Main/Berger-ABM-Innovation-Diffusion-
Agriculture.pdf. 
15
 Lustick, I., & Miodownik, D. (2009). Abstractions, Ensembles, and Virtualizations: Simplicity and  
     Complexity in Agent-Based Modeling. Comparative Politics, 41, 223-244. 
16
 Berger, 247 
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Agent-based models also allow for bounded rationality. Unlike agent-based models, 
rational choice models assumed that all agents always acted rationally. In other words, in rational 
choice models, all agents behaved the exact same way. Because people have different functions 
and levels of importance in society, these models could not reflect the real world. Agent-based 
models lack this problem as agents can have access to different information to make decisions 
and have different computing powers.17 Epstein explores bounded rationality in his model 
“Sugarscape” as he restricts the opportunities that different agents perceive depending on their 
set of attributes. These attributes include their vision, metabolism and more. Thus, the researcher 
has the ability to ensure that each agent behaves differently. Virtual Pakistan takes advantage of 
this capacity by maintaining both elite agents and basic agents. Elite agents receive information 
and adjust based on other assigned elites regardless of those agents’ geospatial locations. 
However, basic agents only receive information and adjust their identity repertoire based on 
those agents directly next to them.  
Complex and emergent phenomena are apparent in agent-based models. Unlike other 
types of models such as rational choice or game theory models that eventually end in 
equilibrium, agent-based models can continue forever in an unstable or chaotic state. Johnson 
writes that this occurs because the micro interactions often led to an unexpected aggregate 
outcome. Miller and Page add that for the natural sciences, reaching equilibrium signifies the 
death of a system.18 In the real world, social systems do not die out and thus this equilibrium and 
chaos is necessary. Agent-based models allow complex phenomena to emerge in the model 
through a bottom-up process. 19 
                                                          
17
 Epstein, Joshua. "Agent-Based Computer Models and Generative Social Science." John Wiley & Sons,  
             Inc. 4 (1995): 41-60. Pg. 2  
18
 Miller & Page, 83  
19
 Epstein, 42 
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Systematic and logical rules are required to run an agent-based model.20  This is the 
major difference between qualitative models and agent-based models. Qualitative models, 
especially in fields such as political science, are susceptible to scholars’ internal biases. Agent-
based models prevent this occurrence, as computer models will not accept rules that are not 
logical. While qualitative models could include specific and rigorous rules to make predictions, 
there is no requirement.  
Agent-based models serve as a platform to test hypothetical “what-if” scenarios for the 
purpose of refining the model. Hugh Gusterson mentions this benefit of agent-based modeling as 
a rationale for testing nuclear simulations.21 Agent-based models can examine what if scenarios 
because the parameters allow for variation. All experiments are also repeatable and recoverable. 
As Miller and Page state, simulations allow the researcher to “rerun the tape.”22 Laura Mcnamara 
also discusses the benefits of computer simulation of nuclear weapons in her paper as she writes 
that rerunning the experiments forced experimenters “to characterize the device under 
development and refine theoretical models, defining new questions, and – as necessary – using 
the data to prepare for further tests.”23 Thus, running “what if scenarios” and multiple tests 
improved the quality of the model as will be seen in the experimentation section of this paper.  
Agent-based modeling can also account for geographical elements of a model. Berger 
writes that for his agricultural model, ignoring spatial dynamics may drastically impact the 
outcome of his model.  He writes, “in rural areas, where many farms with a high marginal 
productivity attempt to expand their acreage, this can lead to excessive land prices that may even 
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prevent the realization of economies of scale. Ignoring these spatial dynamics by assuming 
perfect land allocation among farms is not always an adequate representation of reality.”24 The 
capacity for geographical considerations also matters in Virtual Pakistan. As discussed in the 
paper, Global Information Systems (GIS) is used to map the provinces and divisions in the agent-
based model. The provinces and divisions matter in Pakistan because certain groups, such as 
ethnicity and nationalist identity are seeded based on this specific data. The ability to account for 
geospatial factors, therefore, contributes to agent-based models’ value.  
3.5 Limitations of Agent-Based Modeling  
Although there are many benefits to using agent-based modeling, there are also many 
limitations. First, agent based models are only as valuable as the data that a person enters. While 
Virtual Pakistan lacks perfect data, it includes the most granular information available for each 
identity. In most cases, “granular” refers to the provincial level data or the best data available 
whether that is census data or information from Pakistan experts.  
Another limitation mentioned by Paul Johnson is that agent-based models are full of 
unchecked assumptions.25 Although the unchecked assumptions in Virtual Pakistan are a 
limitation, they are still superior to using qualitative mental models. They require the modeler to 
consider questions that qualitative modelers are not considering. For example, one unchecked 
assumption in the model is how much influence a member of the military elite has on other 
agents surrounding it. Although it is difficult to put a quantitative value on this qualitative 
parameter, it forces the modeler to consider this question that was not considered before.  
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Another concern discussed by Axtell is the lack of information that a single run provides. 
Unlike mathematics, running the model reveals little about the social system. Axtell writes,  “a 
single run does not provide any information on the robustness of such theorems. That is, given 
that agent model A yields result R, how much change in A is necessary in order for R to no longer 
obtain?”26  The way to solve this problem is through running the model for multiple scenarios. 
Virtual Pakistan is run for 500 trials, which should solve the problem posed by Axelrod. 
Furthermore, each trial is unique because of stochastic perturbations.  
While there are many limitations to agent-based modeling, it provides a more effective 
platform to model Pakistan than the CFR’s qualitative model. The arguments stated above list 
reasons why the model should, in theory, provide a more effective way to examine Pakistan’s 
future. The following sections will test this hypothesis by explaining the model building process 
and comparing the experiment and results with those suggested by the CFR.   
 
4.  Understanding the Internal Political Dynamics of Pakistan  
Building an effective agent-based model of Pakistan requires both understanding the 
internal political dynamics of the society as well as having command over a modeling platform. 
This agent-based model, constructed using the PS-I software, involves the compilation of a series 
of scripts. These scripts specify information about the nation, including the geographical 
mapping of provinces and districts, the religious, ethnic, political demographics, the types of 
elites in the country and the theories that are driving the behavior of the model.  
Section 3, divided into five subsections, discusses the qualitative information found in 
these scripts. Readers interested in the computer programming aspect of the model should 
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reference the Appendices. The first section, the Dynamic Political Hierarchy explains the main 
theory governing behavior in Virtual Pakistan. The second section, explains the various identities 
the model represents. The third section discusses the elite networks in the model. The fourth 
section explains the temporal and spatial elements of the model. The fifth section, the Generic 
Political Model, operationalizes the rules outlined in the Dynamic Political Hierarchy theory and 
serves as a base for the other scripts.  
 
Figure 1: Ingredients involved in creating Virtual Pakistan 
4.1 The Dynamic Political Hierarchy (DPH)  
Before creating the model, the researcher identifies and operationalizes a theory that will 
govern behavior. In this model, the Dynamic Political Hierarchy serves as the theory directing 
societal structure and group behavior.27 The DPH classifies identities and predicts possible 
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mobilization patterns of agents based on these classifications. The DPH assesses the landscape at 
every time step and assigns identities into one of five categories – dominant, incumbent, regime, 
system and non-system. The category that each agent automatically falls into, as well as its level 
of anger, determines its mobilization patterns. An agent becomes “angry” when it feels as if it is 
not living up to its potential because it identifies with a group that is currently not treated as 
favorably in the society than another group in its repertoire. Thus, each agent’s mobilization in 
society develops endogenously, without the researcher inputting his or her bias into the system. 
The DPH operationalizes three distinct theories - Cross-Cutting Cleavages, Nested Institutions 
and Dynamic Loyalties.   
Cross-Cutting Cleavages theory explains that people’s overlapping identities often impact 
their political behavior. For example, someone who belongs to an isolated ethnic group may 
share other non-ethnic identities in common with the majority; this overlap in identities may 
prevent the person from the isolated ethnic group from feeling completely excluded and acting 
violently. The Nested Institutions is based on David Easton’s theory of political 
institutionalization, in which he claims citizens’ connection to the political elites constantly 
change. The Nested Institution theory is reflected in the five different categories through which 
agents can feel connected or disconnected to the regime; these five categories are called 
dominant, incumbent, regime, system and non-system. Depending on the overlap of identities in 
an agent’s repertoire, an agent will lobby, protest or use violence to express its concerns. The 
third theory, the Dynamic Loyalties theory, explains that individual groups, and hence societies 
are dynamic and constantly changing. In other words, a group that begins politically powerless in 
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the model may acquire followers and raise their status in society. 28 
These three theories are operationalized in the DPH and combined “into a mechanism that 
regulates the intensity of political conflict based on the presence or absence of overlapping 
affiliations.”29 The dominant identity in Virtualizations is the identity with which the plurality of 
agents openly identify. The incumbent identity overlaps with the dominant identity in over 70% 
of the dominant agents.  
Agents who subscribe to identities in either of these two categories feel relatively 
included in society and lobby the government to express concerns. Agents who are not 
subscribed to dominant or incumbent level identities, but only to regime level identities will 
protest when politically mobilizing in the nation.  An agent who is activated on an identity at the 
system level could lobby, protest or even use violence to express its unhappiness, depending on 
which other identities are in its repertoire. If an agent is activated on a system-level identity, but 
has a dominant or incumbent level identity in its repertoire, the agent will lobby when politically 
mobilizing; if an agent activated on a system-level identity has a regime level identity in its 
repertoire, it will protest to express concern and if the system-level agent has only other system 
or non-system level identities in its repertoire, it might use violence. An agent activated on an 
identity categorized in the non-system level that does not share the dominant, incumbent or 
regime level identities in their repertoire is the most removed from society. When an agent is a 
system or non-system agent and it is angry, it looks for targets to attack. If there are agents 
within its attack distance, there is a 10% chance that one of the agents will become its victim.30  
The DPH serves as a module designed to represent political and mobilization 
implications of various patterns of interest and group alignments. However, the DPH lacks 
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specific details about Pakistan’s society and state. The following sections discuss the 
operationalization of this theory, Pakistan’s elite networks, identities, and internal and external 
affairs to complete the model building process.   
4.2 Identities 
The DPH assigns categories and drives mobilization patterns based on the identities that 
agents adopt. Thus, deciding which identities to include or exclude is an extremely important 
task.   Identities consist of those characteristics with which people self-affiliate. In the model, 
each agent has various identities in their repertoire.  Every time step, the identity that an agent is 
activated on has the ability to change. An activated identity refers to the group or affiliation that 
is driving an agents’ behavior at any given time step. A subscribed identity refers to all of those 
identities that are in the agents’ repertoire.  
An assumption in the model is that an agent’s activated identity drives their current political 
behavior. Thus, all of the identities mentioned in this section are politically relevant to Pakistan’s 
political situation. An agent can subscribe to the ethnic, religious, political party and other 
identities described below.  
4.2.1 Ethno-linguistic identities – Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, Balochi  
The most basic ethnic identities in Pakistan are Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Pashtun Muhajir, 
Afghani and Kashmiri.31 In addition to these identities, the model includes Saraiki and Urdu. 
Prior to Pakistan’s independence in 1947, it was a colony of Great Britain. During this time, 
regional identities became increasingly important. This is especially true for provinces such as 
Punjab and immediately following partition, Bengal. Although Bengal is no longer part of 
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Pakistan, Punjab, to this day, maintains the strongest regional identity in the nation. Strong 
presence of regional identities may reveal that the people place their regional concerns ahead of 
their national, religious or socioeconomic concerns.  
4.2.1.1 Punjabi 
Punjabi is the most prominent provincial identity in Pakistan, with almost 45% of the 
population speaking Punjabi.32 Punjabis from different parts of the province vary in their 
occupations, socio-economic statuses, ideologies and even customs. Southern Punjab is primarily 
rural while other areas such as Lahore, are most bustling urban areas in all of Pakistan. While 
there are many nuances within the Punjabi identity, this model serves as a simplification of a 
complex reality. Most Punjabis are found in the Punjab province; however, there are Punjabis all 
over Pakistan and this has been accounted for in the model.   
4.2.1.2 Sindhi 
The Sindhi identity is prominent in the Southeastern part of Pakistan with 14% of the 
population speaking Sindhi.33 The province of Sindh includes influential cities such as Karachi 
as well as some of the most rural parts of Pakistan. Similar to Punjab, Sindh has a large 
landowner population.  Because they are next to Balochistan, there is also some portion of the 
Sindhis who are located in Balochistan.  
4.2.1.3 Balochi 
The Balochi identity is the smallest ethnic population in Pakistan with roughly 5 million 
people out of 180 million associating with this group. Residing mostly in Balochistan, they are 
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primarily rural and tribal. The capital city of Balochistan is Quetta, and even this city is not 
nearly as large as some of Pakistan’s other urban areas.  
The Balochi people have often felt alienated from the central government. A small segment 
of the Balochi people began the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist movement 
against the Pakistani state. They believe that the government and military regimes were taking 
advantage of their gas field revenues. Not only have these requests been ignored, but also other 
issues have infuriated the Balochis. For example, in 2004, President Musharraf constructed a 
cantonment for new troops and authorized the building a the Gawadar port on the Makran Coast; 
both of these infuriated local Balochis, many of whom had to give up jobs, homes and land. The 
BLA drew international attention to these issues by using terrorist tactics including bombing 
pipelines, electricity pylons, and telephone exchanges. While this group is not very large, they 
represent the sentiments of many common Balochis who feel alienated from and resentful 
towards the central government.    
4.2.1.4 Pashtun 
Pashtun is another prominent identity in Pakistan with 15% of the population speaking 
Pashto.34 Pashtuns also have diverse sub-cultures and socio-economic statuses. Similar to the 
Punjabi identity, there are nuances within the Pashtun identity. For the purposes of this abstract 
model, the Pashtun identity acts as an umbrella identity. Pashtuns are found mostly in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; however there is a substantial 
number, roughly 30%, of Pashtuns in Balochistan.   
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4.2.1.5 Muhajir, Afghani, Kashmiri 
Muhajir refers to the group of Pakistanis who migrated from India during the partition. 
Often times, these migrants moved to work in the central government. The Afghani identity is 
also important because a substantial portion of the population migrated to Pakistan during and 
after the 1980s War in Afghanistan and more recently since the NATO invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001. The Kashmiri population in Pakistan mostly resides in the northeastern areas of Pakistan 
and seeks independence. Because the census data lacked statistics on these three ethnic 
categories, they were not seeded into this specific model. However, when data becomes 
available, these categories have been created as placeholders. 
4.2.1.6 Saraiki 
Saraiki is a language spoken in Southern Punjab and mostly found in rural areas. The 
Saraiki identity is included because of claims that the Punjabi identity could not accurately serve 
as one umbrella identity. 35 This identity was also included because the data was available in the 
1998 census.  
4.2.1.7 Urdu 
Although most people in Pakistan understand Urdu, it is often times not the first language for 
the majority of the people. Urdu is the official language of Pakistan and was once the language 
of the power centers in India and the Mughal Empire. The identity is associated with the upper 
class Muslim elites in Pakistan. More specifically, many middle class Punjabis speak Urdu both 
inside the house and out in public. A very small portion of the population claims Urdu is their 
primary language in the census data and therefore it is unlikely it will serve as a unifying 
identity.  
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4.2.2 Religious Identities – Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim 
Pakistan has become increasingly religious in the past few decades. Since the defeat of the 
Taliban and the War in Afghanistan, the number of Islamic extremists within the society has 
increased exponentially. This increase has led to more sectarian violence as well as some 
speculation that Pakistan will become an Islamic state.36 The religious identities, therefore, may 
play a significant role in the nation’s political future and need to be included. The religious 
identities considered in this model are Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, Christian, Qadiani, Hindu, 
Scheduled Caste and more.  
4.2.2.1 Sunni Muslim  
The Sunni Muslim identity is one of the most common identities in Pakistan, with almost 
75% of the population associating with Sunni Islam at some capacity.37 However, not all of the 
people who identify with Sunni Islam share the same definition of this identity. In Pakistan, a 
substantial portion of the population is Muslim only by name. They may associate with the 
religion for traditional or cultural reasons, and may not practice Islam.  More importantly, these 
Pakistanis are less likely to identify with any type of political movement that would emerge 
under the name of Sunni Islam. Because not all 75% of the Sunni Muslims in Pakistan would 
actually identify with a movement, the model accounts for this and places a limit on how many 
agents in each province can acquire the Sunni Muslim identity.  
4.2.2.2 Shia Muslim 
Shia Muslims are the second largest religious sect in Pakistan. Approximately 15% of the 
population associates with this identity. Recently, Shia Muslims have been victims of terrorism 
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from Sunni Muslim organizations in Pakistan.38  Similar to the Sunni Muslim identity, there is a 
limit on how many people will identify with this religion.   
4.2.2.3 Other religious minorities: Christian, Qadiani, Hindu, and Scheduled Caste 
In addition to the widespread Muslim identities, some Pakistanis associate with other 
religions such as Christian, Qadiani, Hindu and Scheduled Caste. These figures were included in 
the model because the 1998 population census data included these statistics; however, it is 
extremely unlikely that these groups will impact the model drastically. 
4.2.3 Political Party Identities – PPP, PML-N 
The political parties are an important part of this model because they show the different 
families vying for power in the country. Unlike in the United States where the Democrats and 
Republicans have extremely different perspectives and have two distinct visions for the country, 
the political parties in Pakistan lack such ideological platforms. There are a number of political 
parties, some are more liberal and popular than others, but they do not preach fundamentally 
distinct ideals. Political parties do not overlap with specific ethnic groups in this model, but there 
are patterns of affiliation with specific parties. For example, many PPP members are Sindhi,39 
and many PML-N members are Punjabi.  
4.2.3.1 PPP 
The Pakistan People’s Party is Pakistan’s most influential and popular political party. The 
PPP is originally the party of the Bhuttos, namely Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto. Asif 
Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s husband, currently leads the party and serves as the President of 
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Pakistan. The PPP’s base resides in Sindh; however, a significant portion of Northern Punjab 
also associates with the PPP.  
4.2.3.2 PML-N  
The Pakistan Muslim League (N) is the only realistic competitor of the PPP. It is the only 
other political party that has won a civilian government election. Nawaz Sharif is the leader of 
this political party. This party’s political agenda is very similar to that of the PPP. PML-N’s 
political base is in Punjab.  
4.2.3.3 Other Political Parties  
 The remaining five parties included in the model are PML-Q, ANP, MMA, MQM and 
PPP (S). PML-Q is former President Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League and has many 
supporters. President Musharraf recently returned to Pakistan to lead his party for the elections in 
May 2013.40 ANP, the Awami National Party, is a leftwing Pashtun party. MMA, Muttahida 
Majlis-e-Amal, which is a right wing religious party, gained support in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
MQM, Muttahida Qaumi Movement, is a political party that gained support in Sindh. PPP (S), 
another faction of the Pakistani People’s Party was named after Aftab Ahmad Sherpao. While 
not all of these parties have substantial support, these were the seven major parties, which had 
comprehensive data available. 
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4.2.4 Societal Identities – state, nationalism, globalism, military,  
In addition to regional, religious and political identities, this model includes other identities 
mentioned in survey data. 41 These identities reflect the type of government and society that 
Pakistanis desire could insinuate a change of government if enough people associate with them.  
4.2.4.1 State 
The state identity describes an individual who works in the bureaucracy or supports the 
current state apparatus as it is. This is different from the nationalist identity, which describes an 
individual who supports the idea of Pakistan but not necessarily the central and civilian state 
apparatus such as the legislative branch, the executive branch or bureaucracy.  
4.2.4.2 Nationalist 
The Pakistani nationalist represents people residing in Pakistan who view themselves as 
Pakistani “above all else,” as opposed to Muslim or Punjabi or any other identity “above all 
else.” Unlike the state identity, this reflects the people who support the idea of Pakistan rather 
than the actual state or military apparatus. These people would actively oppose any efforts of a 
separatist movement.  
4.2.4.3 Globalization  
Pakistanis who support economic and political integration with the Western world associate 
with the globalization identity. This identity specifically uses survey data from the Asian 
barometer and seeds agents based on the number of Pakistanis who disagreed with the statement 
that U.S. culture is ruining Pakistan. Pakistanis who answered “no” to this question support the 
integration of Western cultures into their own.  
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4.2.4.4 Military 
 The military is Pakistan’s most influential and complex institution. In Pakistan’s short 65-
year history, there have been three military coups by General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq 
and General Musharraf. Military coups, often times were welcomed in Pakistan because of the 
ineffectiveness of civilian rule. The military identity is seeded according to a survey question 
asking how many people in the country approve of or associate with the Pakistani military’s 
actions.  Throughout history, the Pakistani military has maintained widespread approval. In the 
last few years, however, this has slightly changed. Pakistanis dislike the army’s collaborative 
relationship with the United States and Americans dislike the Pakistani army’s friendly relations 
with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI, and religious groups. The military’s precarious and 
dynamic role in Pakistan makes it one of the most interesting identities in the model.  
4.2.4.5 Jihadi identity 
The Jihadi identity refers to those Muslims who are products of the madrasas in Pakistan or 
have joined an Islamist organization. Most of the time, people who identify as Jihadis follow a 
strict, Arab Wahabi interpretations of Islam. Over the last 7 years, these Jihadis or violent non-
state actors have become a source of internal conflict in Pakistan. Violent non-state actors are 
those individuals who either belong to or associate themselves with terrorist organizations, but 
are not necessarily originally from Pakistan. These people, therefore, are not interested in the 
survival of the state in its current form and most of these people want a change of regime. Some 
of the terrorist organizations to which non-state violent actors subscribe are Al Qaeda, the 
Haqqani Network, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lakshar-e-Toiba and many more. While they are clearly a 
significant group in the region, the Jihadi identity in this model lacks the nuances mentioned in 
this analysis.  
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In this model, the Pew Research Center’s data only revealed the number of people who 
sympathize with extremist groups in Pakistan at the national level. There is no data revealing 
how many people support these ideologies per province; thus only national data is used.  
4.2.4.6 Criminal/Corrupt 
The criminal/corruption identity refers to those agents who willingly engage in fraudulent 
behavior. This practice is common in Pakistan among politicians and business elites. Pakistan’s 
political elite has a reputation of corrupting the nation; at one point in time, President Zardari’s 
nickname was “Mr. 10%” because of corruption charges against him.42 Based on survey data, 
agents with the corrupt identity believe that accepting bribes is acceptable in certain cases. 
4.2.5 Socioeconomic Identities  
Socioeconomic identities play an important role in Pakistani politics. Although the middle class 
is growing, most Pakistanis are extremely poor. Such poverty has created an uneducated, 
unemployed, uninsured and vulnerable society. Without economic reform in the future, Pakistan 
will continue to struggle with nation building efforts and see little political change. Tracking 
socioeconomic identities also allows the researcher to see how the economic identities compare 
to political, ethnic, religious and other identities.  
4.2.5.1 Poor 
Pakistan’s poverty level has remained high throughout its history. The Social Policy and 
Development Center defines poverty as anyone who earns less than 1,984 rupees in rural areas 
and 2,248 rupees in urban areas. They chose 1,984 because according to their research, 2,248 
rupees were needed in order to buy the minimum number of calories in an urban area and 1,854 
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rupees were needed in order to purchase the minimum number of calories in rural areas. SPDC 
released estimates on the level of poverty in each region in Pakistan, claiming that 37% of 
residents in the NWFP were considered “poor,” 60% in FATA, 31% in Punjab, 25% in Sindh 
and 34% in Balochistan.  
4.2.5.2 Middle Class 
Pakistan’s middle class has increased over the past few years. The definition of middle class 
used is “a class occupying a position between the upper-class and the lower-class … a fluid 
heterogeneous socioeconomic grouping composed principally of business and professional 
people, bureaucrats, and some farmers and skilled workers sharing common social characteristics 
and values.”43 According to this definition, Pakistan’s Institute of Development Economics 
estimates 40% of the nation is in the middle class44.  
4.2.5.3 Wealthy/Upper Class  
Pakistan’s upper class composes a small percentage of the nation. Because there are no 
statistics on the percentage of wealthy people in Pakistan, Virtual Pakistan assumes that 80% of 
the elites are wealthy, and none of the basic agents are wealthy at the initial time step.  
4.3 Elite Networks and Influential Agents 
Every agent in the model has a repertoire of identities. Each agent selects, retains and 
releases identities differently depending on its agent class. An agent class refers to a group of 
agents that behave the same way based on their settings as will be discussed further in the 
Generic Political Model section.  
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Virtual Pakistan consists of two types of agents: basic and influential. Basic agents have low 
influence levels and only gather information from their neighbors to make decisions. Influential 
agents or “elites” can influence more agents in the model and can listen to and gather 
information from other elite agents. There are three types of influential agents in the model: 
political, military and business elites. This section uses scholarly political analyses of Pakistan to 
discuss the creation of elite networks.   
Saeed Shafqat writes in his chapter, Praetorianism and the People, that four elements 
help democracies grow. He chooses to focus on democracy’s functionality based on “elites’ 
ability to bargain, compromise, and build consensus on the normative aspects of democracy.”45 
His analysis examines four different elites in Pakistan – military elites, bureaucratic elites, 
political elite and religious elites and analyzes their respective roles in the country. Some of the 
information in his chapter supports the creation of the elite networks.  
Another author, Anatol Lieven, examines four different elite forces driving Pakistan as 
well. He focuses on the influence of the judiciary, religious, military and political institutions. 
Examining the impact of the judiciary, Lieven discusses the role of the Shariah, the impact of the 
Lawyer’s Movement, the influence of the Courts and more. Explaining Pakistan’s religious 
elites, Lieven discusses the intersection between Sufi Islam and extreme Wahabi Islam. He 
elaborates on the political elites elected to office because of their saintly status and the expansion 
of radicalism and growth of madrassas. Next, he discusses the military elites in great detail, 
describing the army’s multiple military coups, the role of the ISI and the military’s control over 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Finally, he discusses the political landscape, the relationship 
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between the military and civilian government and the influence that the Pakistan People’s Party 
and the Pakistan Muslim League have maintained over the nation since 1970.  
These sources and other data and articles contributed to the creation of Virtual Pakistan’s 
four elite networks – state, military, business and religious elites. In both sources, authors 
suggested that the military and political elites were the most important elites present in the 
nation, as Pakistan has oscillated between military and civilian control since its founding in 
1947. Thus, these elite networks are present in the model. The state elite network consists of the 
civilian government, politicians and the bureaucracy. Although Pakistan’s bureaucracy is a 
separate and more dominant institution than its civilian government, this model treats the 
bureaucracy, executive and legislative elites as one elite network titled “state.” In addition to the 
state elites, the military elites are included in this model. The military elites remain one of 
Pakistan’s most dominant groups as they have taken over the country three times in Pakistan’s 
history and constantly stand as a threat to the civilian government.  
The business elites are incorporated into the model even though neither author explicitly 
addresses this group as a potential force. This model also includes the business elite because of 
the immense amount of corruption and control that the businessmen have in Pakistan. Weak 
institutions have allowed the business elites to become an important force.  The religious elite are 
included in this model as both authors discuss their value. They, however, lack the complexity of 
the state and business elite networks.  
4.3.1 State Elites 
State elites in this model represent all individuals affiliated with Pakistan’s civilian 
institutions. This refers to politicians and bureaucrats. State elites consist of the President, Prime 
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Minister, provincial governors, National Assembly members, provincial legislators and all types 
of bureaucrats.  
Because specific data regarding the ethnic composition of the state elites was unavailable, the 
percentage of ethnic groups and additional identities was inferred based on general knowledge of 
the country. Knowing that the two major political parties in Pakistan are the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)46 and knowing that PPP primarily 
consists of Sindhi47 and PML-N primarily consists of Punjabi, these two ethnic groups make up 
most of the state elite. In this model, 35% of the state elites are seeded as Punjabi and 25% are 
Sindhi. Pashtuns are 10% of the state elite as they maintain some influence through the Awami 
Muslim League’s alliance with the PPP. Balochistan only composes 5% of the state elite as it has 
a relatively smaller population and representation than the rest of the provinces. Punjabi and 
Sindhi also maintain a higher percentage of the state elite because these two groups compose 
most of the bureaucracy.  
 All of the state elites are given the state identity because it can be assumed that by 
working for the government, they are affiliated with the central government as an institution; 
Most, but not all, of the state elites are given the nationalist identity (70%) because some 
politicians’ actions create the impression that they place their sectarian and or business interests 
above the national interests. 25% of the state elite, more than any other group, have the 
corruption identity because many Pakistani politicians, including the current President, have 
been caught stealing from the nation. The rationale for this high seeding is also based on 
Lieven’s description of electing politicians as he says, “a very large proportion of the money 
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made from corruption has to be recycled downwards through patronage or straight gifts.”48 This 
reveals the institutionalized nature of corruption in the state elite networks. Less than half of the 
state elites, 40%, have the military identity based on the historical rivalry between the military 
and civilian institutions. Anatol Lieven discusses the complicated relationship regarding state 
and military as he writes, “Many of Mr. Sharif’s own ministers would come to see [Shuja 
Nawaz’s] brother (Four-Star General) to complain about the PM and ask the military to throw 
him out and replace him with someone else”49  This reveals that some of the state elites support 
the military as a way to overthrow the current politicians. The business identity is infrequent in 
the state elite, 40%, but present nonetheless, because many politicians are tied to the private 
sector. For example, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, is originally from a family that 
owned one of the largest cinemas in Karachi.50 None of the politicians are seeded with the 
USA/Globalizing identity because in Pakistan’s current state, few to no politicians show 
allegiance to the West out of fear of being targets of Islamists.  
The state elites’ political party identities are seeded according to the political divisions in 
parliament. Currently, the parliament includes 30.6% PPP members, 19.6% PML-N members, 
2% ANP members, 2.2% MMA members and 7.4% MQM and .04% PPP-S. Although these 
numbers exclude bureaucratic affiliations, one can assume that bureaucrats will not reveal their 
partiality towards a specific party and as a result, their political party affiliations are less 
important.  
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4.3.2 Military Elites 
The military elites in Pakistan remain one of the strongest groups in the country as they have 
overthrown past civilian governments, controlled a significant portion of land and maintained 
popular opinion for most of the nation’s history. Military elites in this model represent the high-
ranking officials in Pakistan’s military. The military elites are those individuals directly in the 
military, while the military identity refers to Pakistanis who supports the military, including 
veterans. Most of the military elites, therefore, associate with the military identity.   Members of 
the military include ranked officers such as Generals, Lieutenant Generals, Major Generals, 
Brigadiers, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels and more.  
 The ethnic composition of the military includes 57% Punjabis, 14.5% Pashtuns, 17% 
Sindhis, 4% Balochis and 7.5% others. 51  
The military elites’ other identities were seeded according to qualitative data available in 
Saeed Shafqat and Anatol Lieven’s book. Most of the military elites are seeded with the 
Pakistani nationalist identity. Lieven writes, “The military’s obsession with India and Kashmir is 
not in origin Islamist, but Pakistani Muslim nationalist. With rare exceptions, this has been true 
even of those senior officers most closely involved in backing Islamist extremist groups to fight 
against India, like former ISI chief Lt. General Hamid Gul.”52 This information supports the high 
percentage, 80%, of military elites affiliated with the nationalist identity. Unlike the nationalist 
identity, 50% of the military elites have the state identity. This is because while many military 
elites support the idea of the central government, they do not necessarily support the 
disorganization of the central government. As a result, there are fewer military officials who 
support the state. There is a small connection between the military elites and the corruption 
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identity. Lieven discusses the matter as he writes, “Outright individual corruption in Pakistani 
military is as one would expect centered on weapons, procurement and those branches of the 
military dealing with civilian business” He continues and writes that cases of corruption in the 
Pakistani military, “seem to be relatively rare – and, by the standards of Pakistan in general, 
remarkably rare.” Thus, the Pakistani military was given a smaller percentage, 5%, of corruption 
than any of the other elite networks.  
Unlike the other elite networks, the military elites have no connections with the political 
parties in this model based on their independence from the civilian government. Thus, none of 
the military elites identify with any of the political parties in the initial condition.  
4.3.3 Business Elites 
Unlike the military and state elite networks, the business elite consists of a wide spectrum of 
industries and people. Pakistan’s business elite consists of those individuals who are private 
small business owners, small industry elite, landowners of small plots, big industry elite and 
landowners of large industry. Some of the industries involved in the elite networks are the truck 
owners association, the oil industry, gas industry and large banks. They are important because 
they often control the less apparent elements of the Pakistani political sphere. For example, the 
Pakistani Trucking Association, one type of business elite, has the power to cut off NATO’s 
military supply route.  Most of the ethnic, political party and additional identities of the business 
elite are estimates based on general information  
The business elite’s ethnic breakdown consists of 35% Punjabi, 25% Sindhi, 10% Pashtun 
and 5% Balochi. These estimates are based the assumption that since the Punjabis and Sindhis 
have the most political power, they may also provide the most funds to support business in Sindh 
and Punjab. Similarly, most of the landowners are from these two regions. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
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and Balochistan have less political power and smaller populations, thus, the business elite in this 
model are 10% Sindhi and 5% Balochi. These numbers are estimates and susceptible to change.  
Additional identities and political parties followed a similar pattern.  Lieven writes briefly 
about the business elite in his description of the military claiming that, “As in some western 
societies, but to a far greater extent – retired soldiers, are also prized by private businesses and 
NGOs for the qualities of discipline, honesty, hard work, and indeed higher education that they 
have acquired during their military service – qualities which alas are not so common in wider 
Pakistani society.” 53 One can assume that they are interested in the success and functionality of 
the country because they have built the connections allowing them to succeed in their respective 
industries; thus, over half of the business elite are given the national identity and nearly three 
quarters are seeded with the state identity. All of the business elites are given the business 
identities. While it is unclear how many of them are corrupt, one can assume that they are more 
corrupt than the military and less corrupt than the state elites who rely on bribes and patronage to 
votes. Thus, 15% - a value between the amount of corruption in the military and state elites - of 
the business elites are corrupt.  
4.3.4 Religious Elites 
The religious elite refers to those who attend or oversee madrassas, religious clerics who 
give political sermons, leaders of the religious political parties and families that use Islam or 
relations to the Prophets or Saints to acquire political power. Pakistanis often view Islam 
differently from one another and lack a single cohesive ideology as it has mixed both Sufism and 
Wahabi Islamic fundamentalism.  
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In the past, Sufism has played a large role among the Islamic elites. For example, Sufi 
shrines are widely visited by people of both Shia and Sunni sects. People related to Sufi saints 
are widely respected and often these saints, known as pirs, are elected to political office on that 
basis alone. At the same time, the moderate religious class is also growing. For example, in 
January 2013 a religious cleric named Tahrir-ul-Qadri led a long march to Islamabad to change 
political reform under the name of Islam. Leaders from madrassas, religious political parties and 
clerics are all considered part of this group. Thus, a religious elite can be anyone in a position of 
power who chooses to view the political situation through the lens of Islam.  
The model accounts for the diverse nature of the religious elite by treating this elite 
network different from the other three elite networks. At every time step, the model selects a few 
agents who are activated on the Sunni Muslim identity and provides them with a higher influence 
level than a basic agent. Increasing their influence level slightly, the model accounts for the 
unpredictable and flexible nature of the religious elite. Another reason this method differs is 
because unlike other elites, religious elites lack the same institutional listening rules and 
hierarchy. Religious elites may be able to exert influence over a large population in their 
respective regions but they do not always listen to the state, military or business elites 
4.4 Temporal and Spatial Elements  
4.4.1 Geographical Landscape  
Knowing the geographical features of a country is one of the most important parts of 
building a model. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) simplify a complicated process of 
translating the exact locations of specific provinces, divisions, districts, cities and ethnicities on 
the model. GIS files provide specific data on each of these matters.  Using the techniques 
expressed in this section facilitates the process for anyone who would want to replicate either 
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this model or build another Virtualization. The final model includes five GIS files: three of 
which map out the provinces, districts and divisions, one that maps out the settlement points and 
another that maps out ethnic distribution.   
4.4.1.1 Provinces, Administrative Divisions and Administrative Districts  
The first three GIS files mapped out all of the provinces, divisions and districts of 
Pakistan. Every district’s projected population in 2009 was entered into the GIS’s district file.54 
The population data modified the shape of the Pakistan map such that areas with a denser 
population had more agents than areas with smaller populations.   
4.4.1.2  Settlement Points  
After the provincial, divisional and district boundaries were established, another GIS file 
containing the settlement points and major municipalities of the country added another layer of 
detail to the map (Appendix E). Since influential people often reside in populated cities, this file 
helped seed the location of influential Cs in Pakistan.   
4.4.2 Temporal Elements  
  Each trial ran for 100 time steps. Scholars in the CFR report state that they are 
examining Pakistan’s future for roughly the next 10-15 years. Because the CFR report did not 
specify exactly how many years in the future the five possible trajectories would occur, this 
experiment does not specify how many time steps equal one year. 
4.5 Generic Political Model  
The Generic Political Model (GPM) is among the most important components as it binds 
everything in the model together. Within the GPM, a module operationalizes all of the rules 
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mentioned in the DPH. Later sections of the GPM define and tie together attributes and terms 
referenced in other scripts.  
 The GPM serves to define and codify all of the important elements of the model. It is 
composed of multiple sections and specifies information such as the agent attributes, agent 
classes, routines, the dimensions of the model and parameters, bias update routines, subscribed 
bias tests, tension codes, mobilization routines, display routines, rules, views and statistics. The 
GPM ties together all of the previously referenced elements of the model, including the 
geographical landscapes, identities and elite networks. In order to make this point, one can 
examine the first section of the GPM in which the different attributes are listed.  
4.5.1 GPM: Agent Attributes 
Agent attributes are those parameters that only modify agent behavior. The most 
important agent attributes include influence level, rotation trigger, substitution trigger, activation 
substitution trigger and sight range. These attributes impact the agent’s behavior in the following 
ways:  
a. Influence level controls the likelihood that a neighboring agent will adopt another 
agent’s identity. 
b. Rotation trigger controls the rigidity of an agent’s activated identity. Agents with 
high rotation triggers adopt new activated identities less frequently.  
c. Substitution trigger controls the rigidity with which an agent acquires a new identity 
d. Activation substitution trigger controls the rigidity with which an agent acquires a 
new identity and automatically activates on that identity 
e. Sight range controls an agent’s zone of knowledge as measured by the depth of 
proximate agent field that is monitored.  
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 Each of these attributes modifies an agent’s behavior.  Most agents in the model are 
called “basic” because they use the default parameters; the elites, however, have higher sight 
ranges signifying that they have more knowledge than the average person and maintain higher 
influence levels signifying that their opinions hold more weight in society. 
There are other agents’ attributes that control whether an agent is acting violently, 
protesting, etc. These attributes allow the DPH to work effectively. All components of the 
Attributes section contribute to the agent behavior.  Combinations of different attributes create 
unique agent classes.  
4.5.2 GPM: Agent Classes  
The next section of the GPM creates different agent classes. As discussed in the bounded 
rationality section earlier, agents can have different levels of knowledge and computing power. 
In this model, agents can be either basic, or “Influentials.” In the real world, basic agents 
represent people in Pakistan who individually have little to no influence in the country’s political 
affairs and mostly interact with their immediate neighbors. “Influentials” represent the political, 
military and business elites in the country who have the most influence in the nation and interact 
with other influential actors. While basic agents interact with neighbors who are directly next to 
them, elites interact with other elites regardless of their geographical location. The model 
consists of five different types of elites: InfluentialA, InfluentialB, InfluentialC, InfluentialD, 
InfluentialE. InfluentialAs have slightly more influence than basic agents and InfluentialE has 
the highest influence level in the model.   
4.5.3 GPM: Field Commands  
Within the Generic Political model, the field commands section controls the dimensions 
and size of the model.  
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4.5.4 GPM: Parameters  
Another important function of the GPM can be found in the ‘parameters’ section. While 
there are many parameters, the most important parameters are called the bias seed, the bias max, 
bias min, the evolution seed and more.  
The biases are important in that they ensure a level of randomness in the model. As 
discussed earlier, agent-based modeling requires Monte Carlo technique simulations because 
running the model once does not reveal much. The “bias seed” ensures that every trial reveals a 
distinct trajectory by creating unique initial conditions. All identities are assigned a bias; 
identities with high biases are favorable and those with low biases are unfavorable. A trajectory 
can be dramatically altered depending on an identity’s bias. For example, if the military identity 
has a high bias and state has a low bias in a single trajectory, the military identity is more likely 
to dominate the landscape. The bias max and min, also defined in this section, set the range of 
favorability of each identity. For example, an identity with a bias max and min of 0 to 4 will 
always be favorable since it, can only have a positive bias, whereas an identity with a bias range 
of -4 to 0 will always be unfavorable since it can only have a negative bias. In this specific 
model, the default bias range is -3 to 3, implying that every identity has an equal opportunity to 
be favorable or unfavorable. The bias volatility expresses the instability in the region. In this 
model, the bias volatility is 10%, meaning that the region is stable most of the time. This 
parameter was not altered in order to maintain some degree of control over the experiment. The 
evolution seed is also significant because it ensures that each agent transforms with some degree 
of randomness.    
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4.5.5 GPM: Rules 
The GPM also includes the rules of the model. As mentioned earlier, many of the DPH 
theories discussed abstractly in the model are operationalized in this section of the model. In this 
section, basic agents mobilize by lobbying, protesting, attacking or becoming victims. The rules 
ensure that the Dynamic Political Hierarchy theory is applied logically and consistently to all 
agents. For example,  
rule 'protest' becomes 'basic' 
       condition "true" 
       attribute 'Influence_level' "[Influence_level]-protest_influence" 
       attribute 'angry' "angry" 
       attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
This rule is applied when an agent decides to stop protesting in the model. The first line 
states that the agent is going to change from a ‘protest’ agent to a ‘basic’ agent. The condition 
“true” selects the ‘protest’ agent and reduces its high influence level to that of a basic agent. This 
is indicated by the subtraction of ‘protest_influence.’ The last two attributes do not change the 
functionality of protest. The angry attribute measures whether the agent has passed the 
“angry_trigger” and sets the agent attribute as ‘angry’ if it has passed the trigger. The ‘prev_act’ 
attribute measures the agent’s previous activated identity from the last time step.  
4.5.6 GPM: Views 
This section allows the researcher to view the model through different lenses. In this 
specific model, ‘admin1,’ ‘admin2,’ ‘admin3’ and ‘elite’ were created. As shown in Appendix D, 
E and F, the ‘admin1,’ ‘admin2’ and ‘admin3’ views show the geographical boundaries of 
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Pakistan mapped into the agent-based model. In addition, the ‘elite’ view conveniently highlights 
the influential agents and elite networks in the model.  
4.5.7 GPM: Statistics 
The statistics section of the GPM determines which elements are measured in the model. 
Statistics include the number of agents activated on every identity, the DPH level of each 
identity, the number of agents lobbying, protesting, and acting violently, the number of elites for 
specific identities and more. Any other information that the modeler wants to gather can be 
added here.  
5.  Experimenting with Operationalization 
After building the model, a final script combines all of the different subscripts and creates 
a baseline model. The screen shot of Virtual Pakistan at t=0 can be seen in Figure 2. Figure 2 
consists of 4,449 agents. Each square or agent represents a segment of the population. The color 
of each agent represents its activated identity. For example, an agent that is shaded teal 
represents the Punjabi identity and an agent that is shaded yellow represents the military identity. 
Each agent has a separate set of identities that they subscribe to, but are not activated on. For 
example, the agent activated on the Punjabi identity may also be a nationalist, support the 
military and practice Sunni Islam. Activated identities are important because they signify the 
primary identity that is driving an agent’s behavior at the time. Subscribed identities are 
important because as mentioned in the DPH section, they determine how connected or 
disconnected an agent feels to the society and may be relatively easily activated.  
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Figure 2 Snapshot of Virtual Pakistan at t=0 
 
 Running the model generates unique patterns of activated and subscribed identities, 
which represent trajectories of the nation. In this case, 500 distinct futures are produced. A “burn 
in period” of 40 time steps allows the trajectories to differ from one another. Every week I ran 
the baseline for 10-60 trajectories and wrote about the problems encountered and the alterations 
to the model.55 In an attempt to increase transparency and demystify the agent-based modeling 
work, I included a log recording iterations and alterations made throughout the model building 
process.   
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Experimentation Summary 
 
Date Problem after running baseline Modification to Virtual Pakistan 
10/2/12 Elite agents lack specialized 
repertoires 
1. Seed influential agents with appropriate 
political, religious, ethnic and 
socioeconomic identities. 
 
10/19/12 Influential E’s has too many 
identities. For example, the 
most powerful agent in the 
model cannot have the Poor 
identity.  
1. Manually changed the repertoire of 
influential E so that it has the ability to 
acquire the five identities that represent the 
five futures  
2. Create a rule that allows the listening rules to 
change according to the identity activation of 
the Influential E  
11/2/12 All runs show an Influential E 
activated on the same identity 
1. Added a burn-in period  
2. Added a script that would randomize 
activation every run  
11/17/12 Nationalist identity dominating 
the landscape during every run  
No statistic revealing elite 
activation 
1. Reduced the nationalist identity by 
multiplying each value by.3 
2. Added a column to measure when elites 
were activated on the five most important 
identities  
11/24 Nationalist identity continues 
to  dominate the landscape 
during every run  
1. Reduced the nationalist identity by .4 
 
1/17 No problems encountered this 
iteration 
1. Added socioeconomic identities – Poor,  
middle class and wealthy  
2. Added religious elite network by giving 
some Sunni Muslims more influence than 
others 
  1/25 Sunni Muslim capped at 25% 
and is not allowing religious 
elite to play a role  
1. Slightly increase Sunni Muslim percentage 
cap (thickness) 
 
1/31 Final Version of Virtual 
Pakistan completed.  
 
 
After experimenting for months, the final baseline was complete. Virtual Pakistan’s 
purpose is to test the likelihood and possibility of different scenarios suggested by the Council on 
Foreign Relations’ (CFR) Pakistan Crisis Guide.56 As mentioned earlier, the CFR study suggests 
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Pakistan could become a state adrift, experience a military coup, turn into a theocracy, become a 
moderately Islamic government or collapse altogether.  
This experimentation section seeks to explain the operationalization of the five possible 
futures of Pakistan. This section summarizes the CFR’s explanation of the five futures and then 
derives possible metrics of analysis using their definitions. The derivations are based solely on 
the information provided by the CFR’s interactive website and exclude any outside definitions of 
the five futures found in political theory or elsewhere. As will be discussed later, trajectories that 
differ from the five futures outlined by the CFR will remain in an “other” category and will be 
analyzed as other possible futures excluded by the report.  
 Each of the following sections includes three ways of illustrating a particular type of 
future. The first method includes counting the number of identities activated on a specified 
identity; the second method involves counting the number of elites activated on that same 
identity; and the third technique requires observing the activation pattern of the influential E. In 
order to determine the correct method of operationalization, multiple experiments tested which 
of the methods of operationalization worked most effectively.57 
5.1 A State Adrift 
  The first future the Council on Foreign Relations suggests is “A State Adrift.” Daniel 
Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations states that in this future, Pakistan will not see 
political reform, experience little economic growth and maintain contentious relations with India. 
Ashley Tellis, Shuja Nawaz and Kim Barker believe this is the most likely future for Pakistan. 
Steve Coll and Isabel Coleman dissent from their opinion. Ashley Tellis and Shuja Nawaz state 
that this is the dominant future for Pakistan in at least the next decade and possibly after based on 
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historical analysis. Shuja Nawaz rationalizes his prediction by stating that most of the well-
intentioned leaders in the past have failed to make tough decisions and solve the nation’s 
political and social problems. Kim Barker also argues this is the dominant outcome because 
Pakistan is still in “survival mode” with little to no plans to reform in the future. At this point, 
she claims that all civilian leaders are struggling to hold on to power. Only one scholar, Steve 
Coll, disagrees as he claims that the status quo is unlikely to continue because the Indian 
government will not allow this and because the United States will soon transition out of 
Afghanistan. He claims these two external influences will push the country to reform. Isabel 
Coleman remains on the fence about the likelihood of this future, claiming that Pakistan might 
continue on this path, but it could change if there was something that forced it to alter its status 
quo. 58  
  A state adrift can be measured in the agent-based model using concrete rules. The first 
way to code this trajectory is through examining the pervasiveness of the identity of the current 
dominant political party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) as Shuja Nawaz and Kim Barker 
believe that the current people in power will continue to remain there. Thus, if the PPP 
dominates the landscape, this will imply that the masses are electing the same officials and thus 
the state is not changing its policies. The second way to measure this future is to examine the 
pervasiveness of the state identity. The state identity represents people who are satisfied with the 
central government in its current form. Another way to measure this future is by examining the 
number of elites that will continue to support PPP. Lastly, one can examine the identity 
activation of the most powerful agent in the landscape “Influential E.” If Pakistan continues its 
weak and ineffective policies, this could mean that its President has ties with those political 
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parties who have historically had similar policies. Thus, if the influential E is activated on the 
PPP identity, this signifies that it is continuing its historical trend.  
5.2 A Military Coup 
The CFR study defines an authoritarian state as “one in which the military leadership of 
Pakistan reasserts its control over institutions, and in order to do so it feels it needs to use more 
repressive measures to quell dissent; in the process, it may form alliances with Islamist parties as 
a means to work against opposition forces and to keep control over a state that in the past has 
shown the military is difficult to have a firm grip on.” 59 All of the scholars agree that at the 
present state, it is unlikely that the military will take over; however, they are not ruling out this 
possibility. Scholars Steve Coll, Christine Fair, Howard Schaeffer and Isabel Coleman each see 
this as a possible future. Steve Coll believes this is possible because military coups have 
occurred three times already in Pakistan’s history. Although the military insists that they are 
going to remain in the background for the time being, it is possible that they could take over if 
they see a crisis situation. Scholar Christine Fair believes this is a possible future because every 
time the military asserts control over the civilian institutions, they “hollow out” civil institutions 
making it easier for the military to intervene again.  Ambassador Howard Schaffer is also 
concerned about this future and sees it as a possibility as he states the civilian government’s 
current lack of presence and fragility of institutions allows for such a military role. Council on 
Foreign Relations Scholar Isabel Coleman claims that while this future is possible, the military 
class of Pakistan today is more moderate than it has been in previous cases during General Zia-
ul-Haq’s regime. 60 
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A military coup can be operationalized in the model in three different ways. One way to 
code a military coup is to examine how many agents are activated on the military identity. If the 
military identity dominates the landscape, this signifies that many people in the country 
sympathize with or are choosing to align with the military identity and thus the military could 
usurp power.  Another way to measure a military coup is through examining the number of elites 
activated on the military identity. A high number of military, political and business elites 
activated on the military identity signify that the military officials and supporters are penetrating 
national institutions. A third way to measure a military coup in the model is through examining 
the activated identity of the influential E. If the influential E adopts a military identity, this 
signifies that the highest elite in the nation associates with the military over any other identity 
that it could have in its repertoire.  
5.3 An Islamist Government 
  The CFR study also examined the possibility of an Islamist government taking over in 
Pakistan. They claim that in this scenario, Pakistan “veers more radically towards extreme 
ideologies, where the leadership chooses to embrace Islamic attitudes, policies and views that 
change the strategic outlook in the region.” It could also consist of an Islamist party dominating 
the nation or as a replacement to traditional military and civilian structures of governance in 
Pakistan. None of the scholars interviewed in the Council on Foreign Relations saw this future as 
a probable outcome; however, they described what this scenario entails. Isabel Coleman claims 
that Pakistan has already seen this scenario under Zia-ul-Haq and that it is unlikely that this will 
occur again. Reza Aslan claims that this future is an impossible scenario of Pakistan because the 
military is in charge of Pakistan at the core, they will never let nuclear weapons fall into the 
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hands of Jihadists. Howard Schaeffer claims this is unlikely because no Islamist party has ever 
won or could possibly win through democratic elections. Shuja Nawaz claims that this is 
unlikely because there is only a small portion of the government that follows extremist 
ideologies and most people in the nation veer towards Sufi or Salafi Islam. Steve Coll says it’s 
difficult to imagine this future because of cultural, tribal and political forces disrupting the 
country. 61 Thus no scholar believes this is a likely future.  
 An Islamist government can be operationalized in the model in three ways. The first 
technique is by counting the number of agents activated on the Jihadi identity. In this case, the 
Jihadi identity will represent an Islamist government because it represents those Muslims who 
explicitly stated in survey data that they sympathize with religious extremist groups. Thus, this 
identity’s dominance will represent this future more accurately than any other Muslim identity. 
Another way to measure this future is to examine the number of elites activated on the Jihadi 
identity. High numbers of elites activated on the Jihadi identity signifies penetration of the 
government institutions by those who associate with extremism. A third way to measure this 
future is to examine the identity activation of the influential E and measure how frequently the 
agent is activated on the Jihadi identity.   
5.4 A Moderate Government  
 Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations defines “a moderate government” as 
a Pakistan that “pursues some gradual improvements in the quality of its governance, its opening 
to the world, its relationship with India and finds a stable balance with civilian and military in 
charge of the county.” The CFR study expresses the opinion of six scholars, three of whom see 
this outcome as possible and likely and another three who disagree with the feasibility of this 
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outcome. Shahid Burki, Isabel Coleman and Shuja Nawaz believe that this is a feasible outcome 
for a variety of reasons. They claim that Pakistan has hit rock bottom and can only go up at this 
point and that at some point terrorism will become less prevalent. They also believe that external 
actors such as the US, India and China want this future to occur, and lastly they claim that 
Pakistan’s growing middle class consists of 30 million people which could be mustered to create 
a political or economic movement for better. Scholars Daniel Markey, Christine Fair and Hassan 
Abbas disagree with Burki, Coleman and Nawaz’s optimism. They claim that the poor quality of 
education, lack of economic opportunities and the institutions of state indicate that Pakistan is 
less likely to follow this trajectory. They also claim that this future requires 10-15 years of 
economic growth and stability and a change in the mindset of India.62 
 A moderate state can be operationalized in three ways. The first way of operationalizing a 
moderate state is through counting the number of agents activated on the nationalist identity. The 
second technique is to measure the number of elite activated on the nationalist identity. 
The third technique is to measure the identity activation of the Influential E. If the influential E 
activates on the nationalist identity, this will symbolize that Pakistan has found a leader who puts 
the interest of the nation before everything else.  
5.5 A Collapsed State 
The fifth future suggested by the CFR study is a collapsed state. In this case, “the state 
and its institutions are no longer capable of responding to internal or external conflicts.” Scholars 
Reza Aslan, Isabel Coleman, Arpitha Bykere, Kim Barker, Christine Fair and Steve Coll see this 
is an unlikely scenario. Dr. Arpitha Bykere, a senior analyst at the Ruobini Global Economics, 
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claims that economic unrest and political unrest could lead to a situation where the government 
cannot handle the burdens and has no other choice. Kim Barker and Christine Fair claim that this 
is unlikely because of the strong influence of the army and that in order for the state to collapse, 
the army would have to collapse first. Steve Coll believes that external influences will most 
likely ensure that Pakistan stays together because there is a lot at stake for the international 
community. Daniel Markey states that the state could collapse if Pakistan’s “islands of 
instability” or “no-go areas for the army” grow. 63 
The fifth future can be operationalized in three possible ways. Because this future 
requires the complete break down of institutions, it is the most difficult future for Pakistan. For 
this reason, a few things need to happen simultaneously for this to count as secession. The first 
way to operationalize this future is to examine the prominence of the Punjabi identity. Because 
the Punjabi is the most dominant province in Pakistan, the country is reliant on this province 
holding the country together. If the Punjabi identity becomes too dominant, one could assume 
that Punjabis no longer feel that they can connect with the rest of the country. Thus, the 
collapsed state occurs when the Punjabi identity becomes dominant and the state identity 
weakens. The second way to operationalize this future is to examine how frequently elites 
activated on the Punjabi identity. The third way to measure this future is to examine how 
frequently the Influential E is activated on the Punjabi identity.  
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6. Analyzing the Results  
As explained above, I used the CFR explanations to determine which metrics would best 
operationalize the five futures. Based on the CFR’s definition of the five futures, the following 
metrics were used when calculating the likelihood of the five futures: 
Future Operationalization of each future (Between time steps 41-100) 
State Adrift 1. Frequency of PPP/ State dominance 
2. Elite Activation on the PPP 
3. Influential E PPP activation frequency  
Military Coups 1.   Frequency of Military dominance  (DPH) 
2.   Elite activation on the military identity 
3.   Influential E Military activation frequency  
Moderate 1. Frequency of Nationalist and/or middle class dominance 
2. Elite Activation on the Nationalist identity 
3. Influential E Nationalist activation frequency 
Islamist Government 1. Frequency of the Jihadi dominance  
2. Elite Activation on the Jihadi identity 
3. Influential E Jihadi activation frequency  
Collapsed 
Government 
1. Frequency of the Punjabi identity and less than .01% activation on 
state identity 
2. Elite Activation on the Punjabi or Pashtun identity 
3. Influential E Punjabi activation frequency  
 
After running the model for 500 trials, the following data revealed the frequency of each 
of the five futures. Each run lasted for 100 time steps, providing agents with 100 opportunities to 
change activated and subscribed identities.  
Figure 3 shows the frequency of each future according to specific identity activation. The 
y-axis represents the number of times each future was dominant at the end of a trial. The PPP or 
state identities need to dominate the landscape in order to code the trial as a state adrift. The 
nationalist identity needs to dominate the landscape in order to code the trial as a moderate state. 
The military identity, Jihadi identity and the ethnic identities need to dominate the landscape for 
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a military coup, Islamic government and collapsed state respectively. The “other” category refers 
to those futures that did not fit neatly into one of the categories prescribed by the CFR.  
As shown below, Pakistan remaining adrift is the dominant outcome when measuring the 
identity activation. Approximately 275 out of 500 times, PPP or the state identity dominated the 
landscape. After a state adrift, a moderate state occurred most frequently with roughly 112 
futures experiencing this outcome. Military rule, Islamist governance and a collapsed state 
appear less frequently than the other two futures as they occurred less than 25 out of 500 runs. 
The “other” future occurs roughly 10% of the time. However, the other future could be any other 
trajectory in which an unexpected identity, such as business or Shia, dominates the landscape. 
 
  
Figure 3 Bar graph showing the frequency of the five futures presented by the CFR by measuring Identity Activation 
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Figure 4 shows another way to measure the frequency of the five futures by measuring 
the number of elite agents in the model that are activated on the identities mentioned.  As 
explained earlier, elite agents are those agents that have higher influence levels built into their 
rules. There are 15 different types of elite agents - InfluentialsA through E representing military, 
political and business elites. The aggregate influence for all of the elites in the model is 2065. 
Aggregate influence refers to the collective influence that an identity can have in the model; thus, 
the aggregate influence is not how many elite agents are activated on an identity, but rather the 
aggregate influence level.  
The box and whisker plot shows that more frequently than any of the other futures, a 
moderate state occurs. Box and whisker plots depict numerical data by providing five number 
summaries: the smallest observation, the lower quartile, the median, the upper quartile and the 
largest observation. The two edges of the box illustrate the lower and upper quartile, while the 
middle line represents the median. The lines outside of the box show the smallest observation 
and the largest observation.   
In this case, the moderate state maintains the highest upper quartile and median value, 
signifying that that elite activation on the nationalist identity occurs more frequently than any of 
the other identity. The nationalist identity also has the largest range of elite activation. According 
to this graph, in some cases almost half of the elites are subscribed to the military and state 
identity, however, the majority of the time, this is not the case. Elites are also infrequently 
activated on their provincial identities. This particular graph, measuring the provincial elites 
reveals less about the futures because the graph is missing the geographical location. It is 
possible that the political and military elites activated on the Punjabi identity are located in the 
Punjab province. Such information would reveal ethnic pride rather than a prominence of a 
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collapsed future. While there were some outliers, the majority of the elites were not subscribed to 
the jihadi identity. Overall, the graph reveals that the elites see it in their interest to promote their 
nationalist identity rather than any of their other identities
 
Figure 4 Box and Whisker plot with the frequency of the five futures by elite activation 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of the five futures by measuring how often the 
dominant identity and the influential E agent, the most powerful agent in the landscape, are in 
sync. This graph is important because as explained in the DPH section, the dominant identity 
represents the sentiments of the masses and the influential E identity represents the sentiments of 
the President or Prime Minister. If the masses and the leader are activated on different identities, 
this could signify that the leader is passing policies inconsistent with the desires of the masses 
and that the masses are discontent. The mosaic graph, Figure 5, reveals that the state identity is 
the most dominant and powerful identity more frequently than any of the other identities.  The 
nationalist identity also experiences this monopolization of power. However, for most of the 
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identities there is little to zero synchronization between the dominant identity and influential E 
agent. In this graph, the x-axis represents all of the dominant identities and y-axis represents all 
of the identities that Influential E could activate on. The light blue box signifies that the 
dominant identity and Influential E’s identity overlapped many times. The dark blue boxes 
signify that the identities overlapped sometimes and the white boxes signify that the influential E 
and the dominant identity never overlapped.  
 
 
Figure 5 Mosaic graph showing how frequently the most powerful agent on the landscape (Influential E) overlaps 
with the dominant identity 
6.1 Results: A State Adrift 
The data above reveal information about the frequency of the state adrift future. As 
discussed above, Figure 3 reveals that the PPP and state identities dominate the landscape more 
frequently than any other identity in the model. A state adrift occurs in the model nearly twice as 
often as the second most frequent future. Figure 4 reveals that most of the elites were activated 
on the nationalist identity, but a small percentage of the elites were activated on the PPP identity. 
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On average, 3.34% of the elite agents were activated on the PPP identity. Other statistics about 
elite activated on PPP identity include median =  .3874%, the 1st Quartile = 0% and 3rd Quartile 
=1.743%. This information reveals two important findings; first, the basic agents were more 
likely to activate on the PPP and state identity than the elite agents. Second, the model should 
have measured the percentage of elites activated on the state identity to compare the difference 
between those activated on the state identity and those activated on the PPP identity.   
While Figures 3 and 4 provide two different metrics through which one could measure 
the likelihood of Pakistan’s future, they do not account for the overlap between the two metrics. 
Figure 7 shows that on average, when the majority of people supported the PPP, about 25% of 
the elites were activated on the PPP identity. In some cases, this number reached 50% or higher. 
When the other identities were dominant, fewer elites activated on the PPP elites. 
 
Figure 7 Box and whisker plot showing how many elites are activated  on PPP when different identities are 
dominant 
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The data from the simulation also reveals that Influential E was activated on the state and 
PPP identity 37.19% of the time.  
 All of these graphs and screenshots suggest that when the PPP is in power, large 
segments of the population support their presence.  Intuitively, this conclusion makes sense 
because it suggests that when members of the PPP are in power, Pakistani citizens have voted 
them into office. When Pakistanis vote members of this party into office, this indicates that 
Pakistan will continue with the status quo. For example, in 2008, Pakistanis elected President 
Asif Ali Zardari to serve as the President of the country and little has changed under his 
leadership.64 Although the country had experienced PPP leadership under Benazir Bhutto and 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari had never previously served as the country’s President. 
However, he continued the same patterns of governance of previous PPP leaders. During his 
Presidency, Pakistan lacked any major political reforms, experienced an energy crisis, saw no 
improvement in economic conditions, health care, education and did not establish any long-term 
vision for the nation.65  
Although PPP’s past ineffectiveness does not guarantee a future of ineffective policies, 
there are no signs of party reformation. In December 2012, the Pakistani People’s Party 
announced that Bilawal Zardari-Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari’s son, was the new 
party chairman.66 If Bilawal comes to power at any point in the future, he will continue PPP’s 
tradition of hereditary political dynasties. These dynasties have proven strong despite their 
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“repeated failures in government, repeated failures to deliver on promises to the masses and in 
many cases, the abandonment of whatever genuine ideology they ever possessed.”67 Thus, if 
Pakistanis elect PPP officials again, they are likely to experience the same weak patterns of 
governance.  
As mentioned above, Pakistan experts believe that this future is most likely to continue 
because it has been Pakistan’s dominant future during its 65-year history. The model 
complements the qualitative data by revealing the frequency of this scenario. The model goes 
one step further as it allows a researcher to visualize slight differences within this scenario. The 
following screenshots show different ways a state adrift could unfold in Pakistan.  
 
Figure 8: A screenshot of the model at t=100 in which the state identity dominates the landscape. 
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The version of “A State Adrift” in Figure 8 reveals that the state identity, shown in orange, 
dominates the landscape throughout most of the country except in Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan. The state identity in this case signifies support for 
the current government, which is PPP. FATA’s lack of support for the state identity signifies that 
people in that region still feel alienated from the rest of the nation. It also suggests that under this 
future, FATA will remain an autonomous unit separate from the federal government.  As 
mentioned early, scholars believe that as long as FATA feels alienated from the nation, the 
country will continue to experience violence68 and have trouble creating a national identity. This 
model also reveals that people residing in Balochistan lack any connection to the state identity.  
Such alienation of Balochistan reflects the status quo as Balochistan has experienced the most 
violence from sectarian groups in the past few months and received little to no support from the 
current government.69   
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Figure 9: A screenshot of Virtual Pakistan when PPP dominates the landscape on the way to t =100. 
 
 Another version of “A State Adrift” can be seen in Figure 9. In this case, the dark blue 
signifies that the PPP identity dominates the landscape on the way to t=100.  As mentioned 
earlier, the PPP represents a version of Pakistan that adheres to traditional methods of politics in 
which nation-building efforts are ultimately ignored and severe problems remain unsolved.  
6.2 Results: A Military Coup 
As mentioned above, the military identity dominates the landscape in less than 25 out of 
500 runs. This frequency is less than that of the moderate, state adrift and non-categorized 
futures. However, the future occurs more frequently than a collapsed state or an Islamist state. 
Figure 4 reveals that most of the elites were activated on the state and nationalist identities and a 
small percentage of the elites also associated with the military. On average, .0375% of the elite 
agents were activated on the military identity. Other statistics about the relationship include 
median =  .58%, the 1st Quartile = .7% and the 3rd Quartile =2.7%. Thus, elites were very 
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infrequently activated on the military identity. The two graphs reveal that people less frequently 
identify with the military identity than with other identities in their repertoire. Furthermore, the 
entire nation will rarely unite under the military identity. The rarity of the military identity 
among the elites and the common people suggests that people no longer desire military 
interventions. Although it may seem obvious that people would not want military interventions, 
it is important to note that all of Pakistan’s previous coups have had the support of the masses.  
While Figures 3 and 4 provide two different metrics through which one could measure 
the likelihood of a military coup, they do not account for the overlap between the two metrics.  
Figure 10 shows that on average, when the majority of people supported the military, about 25% 
of the elites were activated on the military identity. In some cases, this number reached 60% or 
higher. When the other identities were dominant, there are little to no elites who openly 
supported the military identity.  
 
 
Figure 10: Box and whisker plot showing how many elites are activated on military when different identities are 
dominant 
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 The data reveals that the Influential E is activated on the military identity 4.43% of the 
time.  
 All of these graphs suggest that a military coup occurs less frequently than some of the 
other futures. The CFR report suggests that this future is possible, but not necessarily probable. 
The data from the model complements this conclusion by showing similar findings. In Pakistan, 
people support the military as an institution but they do not believe that the military should 
intervene in political situations.70 Without public support, it is unlikely that the military will take 
action against the government. 
 Pakistan completed its first civilian government term without military intervention, in its 
65-year history, on March 16, 2013.71 Such information suggests that Pakistan may be shifting 
away from a nation with weak civilian institutions and military interventions. However, this 
could also be a temporary phase in Pakistan’s narrative. History suggests that the military usually 
intervenes at 10-year intervals; thus, it is possible that Pakistan is in the middle of this interval 
and only at this current moment, a military coup appears unlikely. It is in the military’s interest 
to be in power and direct Pakistan’s budget towards defense spending. Although there are a 
number of questions that remain unanswered, it appears unlikely that Pakistan will experience a 
military coup in the short term.  
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Figure 11 Screenshot of Pakistan experiencing a military coup on the way to t=100 
Figure 11 shows an example of Pakistan experiencing a military coup. Although people 
maintain other identities in different parts of Pakistan, the majority of the Punjab province 
remains “yellow,” signifying it is receiving tremendous support in that region. Interestingly, 
other parts of Pakistan do not share Punjab’s sentiments, as PPP remains the dominant identity in 
Sindh and Jihadi in Balochistan.   
6.3 Results: An Islamist State 
Figure 3 reveals that the Jihadi identity dominates the landscape less frequently than all 
of the five futures with the exception of the collapsed state. Out of 500 runs, the Islamist future 
occurred less than 15 times. Figure 4 reveals that very few elites were activated on the Jihadi 
identity.  On average, .01% of the elites were activated on the Jihadi identity. This signifies the 
difficulty that an elite would have associating with the Jihadi identity.  
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 Figure 12 shows that on average, more elites were activated on the Jihadi identity. When 
the other identities were dominant, there are fewer Jihadi elites. The data reveals that the 
Influential E is activated on the Jihadi Identity in 2.24% of the futures.   
 
Figure 12 Box and whisker plot showing how many elites are activated on Jihadi when different identities are 
dominant 
  
 All of the graphs reveal the unlikelihood of Pakistan experiencing some type of Islamic 
take over. This does not mean that it is impossible, but it does suggest that it would be more 
difficult for Pakistan to veer towards this trajectory. While there are people who support Islamic 
groups, the vast majority of the citizens prefer peace to an Islamic government that could 
possibly increase the amount of violence in the country. As discussed earlier in this paper, there 
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are several ways such an outcome could occur. However, the lack of cohesion of the different 
Islamic groups suggests that it would be difficult for such a unified effort to occur.   
 
Figure 13: Screenshot of Pakistan experiencing an Islamist state on the way to t=100 
 Figure 13 provides an example of when the Jihadi identity dominates the landscape. In 
this case, the dark purple represents the Jihadi identity and represents those people who 
sympathize with the Islamist cause. As shown by the yellow (military) and orange  (state) 
identities, there are certain segments of the population that do not sympathize with the Jihadi 
cause. They are, however, surrounded by agents who do support the cause.  
6.4 Results: The Moderate State 
The fourth future suggested by the CFR was a moderate state. Figure 3 suggests that this 
is the second most frequent future after a state adrift. Out of 500 futures, this future occurred 
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around 130 times. Figure 4 suggests that more often than any other identity, elites were activated 
on the nationalist identity. On average, 18.74% of the elites were activated on the nationalist 
identity at any given time step. The box and whisker plot shows that the median = 4.02%, 1st 
Quartile = .77%, 3rd Quartile = 24.87%. In one future, 91.7% of the elites were activated on the 
nationalist identity.  
Figure 14 shows that when the nationalist identity is the dominant identity, on average, 
1000 to 1600 elite agents were also activated on the nationalist identity. This graph reveals that 
more often than any of the other futures, elite agents and basic agents are both activated on the 
nationalist identity. In addition to this graph, the data reveals that the Influential E is activated on 
the nationalist identity 16.86% of the time.  
 
 
Figure 14 Box and whisker plot showing how many elites are activated on Nationalist when different identities are 
dominant 
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 Pakistani experts see this scenario as the most optimistic future out of the five options 
because it means that democracy is not only functioning, but also solving the country’s 
problems. In such a future, a political party with strong ideological platforms geared towards 
improving the political, economic, social issues of the nation would win. Although there is no 
guarantee that Pakistan will see such a government in the near future, there are signs that this is a 
viable option.  
Many would argue that Imran Khan’s political party, Tehreek-e-Insaf, winning the 
election in May 2013 would represent one way that a nationalist government could come to 
power. For the first time, a party has a platform that addresses important welfare issues such as 
corruption, education, terrorism and much more. Furthermore, he is striving to build a political 
party institution that differs from the political dynasties established by families such as Bhutto 
and Sharif. Although he is a competitive candidate in the upcoming election, it is unlikely that he 
will gain the majority in Parliament necessary to rule the nation. In the model, this future occurs 
the second most frequently after the status quo. Although this does not necessarily mean that it is 
the second most likely future, it does suggest that it is less difficult for Pakistan to pivot towards 
this future rather than others.  
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Figure 15 A future in which the nationalist identity is dominant on the way to t=100 
 
Figure 15 provides an example of a moderate state. The magenta represents the 
nationalist identity and a significant portion of every province includes agents activated on this 
identity. In such a scenario, one can imagine fewer identities feeling alienated. Less alienation 
may result in fewer terrorist attacks and more cohesion.  
6.5: Results: Collapsed State 
Figure 3 suggests that provincial identities are less likely to outweigh nationalist 
identities. Out of the 500 futures, the provincial identity Punjab dominates the landscape less 
than 30 times.  Figure 4 shows the frequency with which elites are activated on the Punjabi 
identity.  On average, .8% of the elites were activated on the Punjabi identity at time step 100. 
The box and whisker plot shows that the median =.1%, 1st Quartile = 0%, 3rd Quartile = .7264%. 
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In one future, 33.75% of the elites were activated on the Punjabi identity. The results show that 
the Influential E is activated on the Punjabi identity .82% of the time. Thus, this identity is less 
pervasive and reveals the low frequency with which this future occurs.  
Figure 16 shows that when the Punjabi identity is the dominant identity, the elites are 
mostly activated on the Jihadi and the Poor identities.   This data reveals that while the national 
government is collapsing and provincial identities are becoming stronger, the Jihadi influence is 
also increasing. In addition, the poor identity also occurs frequently.  If these two identities are 
dominant during the same run, this could insinuate that the poor are supporting the Jihadi identity 
in their effort to spread an Islamic government. In the process, they are weakening the nationalist 
government and promoting provincial identities.  
 
Figure 16: Box and whisker plot showing the number of elites activated on the Punjabi identity when different 
identities are dominant  
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 If the provincial identity of Punjab dominates the landscape, this signifies that ethnic 
behavior is driving the model as opposed to any other national or religious identity.   
6.6 Other Observations and Inferences  
 Although the previous graphs provide answers to the questions posed about the likelihood 
of each future, they leave out important details about the experiments. The following three 
graphs illustrate how frequently people lobbied, protested, or used violence during the respective 
futures. Figure 17 shows the frequency with which people lobbied in each of the five futures. As 
explained in the Dynamic Political Hierarchy section earlier in the paper, lobbying occurs when 
people feel connected to the dominant group in the nation by either one or two degrees of 
separation. When people feel connected to the dominant group in the nation, this means that 
there are fewer disagreements expressed through protest and violence. The graph reveals that 
lobbying occurs most frequently in the moderate state and a state adrift. In a moderate state, the 
Pakistani nationalist identity is widespread and reduces disagreement. In a state adrift, the state 
identity is widespread and reduces divergent opinions. Islamist, collapsed, or military states 
experience less lobbying than the moderate or current state. This may be the case because the 
Jihadi, provincial and military identities are less widespread and as a result, are more likely to 
experience dissenting opinions and alienate people. Protest occurs less frequently in the 
moderate and current state as shown in Figure 18. On average, the military and Islamist state see 
the most protest, followed by the collapsed state and others. Violence, however, occurs most 
frequently in the state adrift and non-categorized futures, followed by moderate, collapsed state, 
military and Islamist rule as shown in Figure 19.  
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Figure 17: Box and whisker plot showing how frequently agents lobbied in each future 
 
 
Figure 18: Box and whisker plot showing how frequently agents protested in each future 
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Figure 19: Box and whisker plot showing which future produced the most violence.  
 
 
6.7 Summary and Discussion  
 Careful examination of the data reveals that certain futures, namely a state adrift and a 
moderate state, occur more frequently than other futures such as a military coup, an Islamist state 
or a collapsed state. A state adrift occurred in the majority of the scenarios. When the state 
identity was dominant, the most powerful agent, influential E, was frequently also activated on 
the state identity. There were also a few cases in which PPP was the dominant identity as well as 
the most powerful agent on the landscape. When the PPP identity was dominant, it was common 
for the majority of the elites to be activated on the PPP identity as well. The model statistics did 
not capture data on the elites activated on the state identity and thus it cannot be confirmed that 
the same pattern occurred; however, examining the new field viewer and watching the model 
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reveals that this is the case. Thus, a state adrift occurred more frequently than any other future. 
Interestingly, scholars Shuja Nawaz, Ashley Tellis and Kim Barker predicted this occurrence.  
A moderate state also occurred frequently in the model as the Nationalist identity was 
activated second most frequently than any of the other futures. Out of the futures when the 
nationalist identity was dominant, there were many cases when the influential E was also 
activated on the nationalist identity as shown by the Mosaic graph. When the nationalist identity 
was dominant, it was common for the majority of the elites to be activated on the nationalist 
identity. Thus, a moderate state in which the leaders and elites strive for the creation of a 
cohesive Pakistani nationalist identity appears plausible in the model.   
The remaining three futures suggested by the CFR, a military state, an Islamist state and a 
collapsed state occurred less frequently when measuring the identity activation, elite activation 
and influential E. Although these futures are still possible, they appear to require more effort 
than continuing on the current path of a state adrift or reacting to the current state by promoting a 
patriotic and nationalist identity. As stated in the results section, it appears that these identities do 
not achieve the same widespread popularity that the other two identities reach.  
Interestingly, other futures excluded by the CFR can be seen through the model. More 
frequently than the military, Jihadi and provincial identities, the business identity dominates the 
landscape as shown in Figure 22. A business identity could insinuate that Pakistan is 
experiencing a growth of citizens interested in exploring the private sector and using innovation 
and entrepreneurship to earn money. This future appears completely plausible as currently 
Pakistan is making efforts to expand microfinance and encourage a segment of the population 
interested in starting and maintaining a business. 
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 Another future that occurred frequently in the virtual model is one in which poverty 
becomes the dominant identity in the nation. A nation in which poverty is the dominant identity 
would consist of social unrest and political instability, as people would be using their 
socioeconomic identity to make political decisions. A future in which poverty remains the 
dominant identity could be a future in which political revolution leads people to overturn the 
current regime and demand equality.  
 
Figure 22: Bar graph displaying how frequently different identities are dominant 
 
PSCI 499 – Honors Thesis  Quratul-Ann Malik 
 82
 
Figure 23: Screenshot in which the Poor Identity dominates the landscape at t=100. Poor identity represented 
through the light blue shading 
 
Furthermore, the model produced interesting futures in which combinations of identities took 
over the nation. Figure 24 shows an example of a future that did not fit neatly into the five 
categories produced by the CFR report. The dark blue represents the PPP identity and the pink 
represents the business identity. In this case, the PPP and the business communities have taken 
over the country. This could represent a future in which the PPP has promoted business or 
supported endeavors that would help grow the country’s economy.  
 Figure 24 represents another example of a future that did not fit neatly into the five 
categories produced by the CFR report. The yellow identity represents the military and the light 
green represents the PML-Q identity. Since the PML-Q political party was General Musharraf’s 
political party, it seems likely that the military would also have tremendous support.   
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Figure 24: On the left, a snapshot of a future of Virtual Pakistan at time step 100 in which the business identity and 
PPP identity dominate the landscape. On the right, a snapshot of a future of Virtual Pakistan at time step 100 in 
which the military and the PML-Q identity dominate the landscape.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 Policymakers are constantly striving to answer the question - what will happen next? 
Until recently, they could only rely on area experts to provide answers to that question. Agent-
based models, however, have the capability to change the way policymakers review scenarios. 
 Pakistan, as discussed earlier, is one of the most important country’s to understand. With 
suicide bombings, religious and separatist movements, poor economic conditions and weak 
political institutions, Pakistan is experiencing one of the toughest times in its history. On top of 
this already stressful situation, Pakistan maintains nuclear capabilities and is also an ally of the 
United States, assisting in the War in Afghanistan since 2001. All of these ingredients suggest 
that there is a great demand to understand the nation and examine which direction the nation will 
take. 
 The Council on Foreign Relations, and other Pakistan experts, answer this question by 
closely examining five possible futures that Pakistan could take based on qualitative analysis. In 
this thesis, I attempt to approach the same question – what will happen to Pakistan – through a 
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non-conventional technique of agent-based modeling. I hypothesize that agent-based modeling 
will reveal more information and will complement the CFR’s report. To accomplish this task, I 
explained the model building process step-by-step, run the experiment and analyze the results 
gathered from the test. Comparing the Council on Foreign Relations’ paper to the results from 
the model, I examined to what extent the model facilitates the five futures presented by the CFR. 
More specifically, I seek to answer – How does the model help policymakers and people who are 
trying to understand Pakistan? And what does the model reveal that the literature excludes? 
 Agent based models do not attempt to forecast which future will happen, but instead 
provide a more useful way of exploring the space of possible futures of a nation like Pakistan. 
Through the model building process, it was obvious that agent-based models require a complete 
dissection and analysis of every aspect of society. When listening to experts discuss their 
thoughts on Pakistan’s future or reading literature on the subject, authors and scholars rarely go 
into detail regarding how they are defining a “military elite” or a “Punjabi.” The CFR report 
acknowledges that elites have influence over the population, but the scholars do not 
systematically account for how much influence elites have, whom they interact with, and how 
elites’ interactions impact the futures as a whole. Agent-based modelers need to answer such 
questions, as the computer simulation does not work unless everything is defined as explicitly as 
possible. 
 Qualitative experts studying Pakistan have no requirement to specify their terms and 
sometimes leave terms undefined.  They also do not need to explain which theories they are 
basing their predictions on. Although theory is not always necessary, it ensures that a scholar is 
looking at a work consistently and not accidentally incorporating biases into their thoughts on a 
situation. Agent-based modeling prevents such incidences from occurring as all of the rules 
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guiding model behavior are based on theory. Such consistency is unique to computer simulation 
and thus complements qualitative models such as the CFR report. 
The agent-based model also allowed visualization of patterns in a spatial realm. As 
discussed in the model building section, the model accounts for the various provinces, divisions 
and districts. Most of the identities, ethnic, religious, socioeconomic and societal identities, are 
seeded at the provincial level. Creating and seeding Virtual Pakistan forces the researcher to find 
detailed data and systematically think about how provincial activity impacts the future of the 
nation.  
Agent-based modeling also greatly enhanced the CFR’s report by adding to the possible 
scenarios.  There are futures that are not mentioned in the CFR report that occur frequently in the 
model. For example, the business identity dominates the landscape on multiple occasions 
signifying that Pakistan could experience more economic than political changes and could 
become less agriculture over the coming years. Such a scenario correlates with theories in the 
literature suggesting that Pakistan will experience climate changes in the coming years that may 
negatively impact the agriculture sector. Agent-based modeling does not predict futures as much 
as it serves as a palette of possible futures. While the human brain is only capable of imagining a 
finite number of scenarios, the computer lacks such biases or limitations and can create a wider 
range of trajectories.   
While the model is extremely useful, it has one main limitation. As discussed earlier, 
agent-based models are only as good as the data entered into them. While most of the data was 
obtained from surveys and the census, there was some unavailable data. For example, there is 
little to no available information on the religious and ethnic breakdown of Pakistan’s business 
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elites; thus, this information was assumed based on reading books and articles. As more 
information becomes available, it can easily be entered to improve the model.  
There are many benefits and limitations to using agent-based modeling to measure the 
CFR’s report on Pakistan’s five futures. The most important added value of agent-based 
modeling is that it provides a palette of futures broader than those discussed by the CFR and 
others.  Each future provides a unique story of what Pakistan’s future could look like and in this 
case, 500 unique stories were created.  
After such a long analysis of Pakistan, the question remains – what do the scholars and 
the model suggest will happen to Pakistan in the coming years? The qualitative and quantitative 
models suggest that Pakistan will continue to muddle through without any nation building efforts 
or political, economic or social improvements. Such a scenario means that Pakistan will most 
likely continue on its current path without improvements. In the weeks following the 
experimentation, on March 16, 2013, Pakistan completed its first term of civilian governance 
since its founding in 1947.  A caretaker government currently governs the nation and will remain 
in charge until the next election in May 2013. One could assume that if PPP leaders, in charge 
from 2008 to 2013, get reelected, the country will continue on its path of muddling through. 
However, maintaining the status quo seems unsustainable as Pakistan is facing many 
unique problems that it has never faced in its history.  In the coming years, American troops will 
completely withdraw from Afghanistan. As discussed earlier, Pakistan is an ally of the United 
States and when the United States withdraws, it will need to find a way to deal with the 
instability that will follow, as there is a high probability that all of the terrorist organizations 
attacking American troops will increase attacks in Pakistan. To make matters worse, Pakistan is 
facing one of the worst energy crises in its history. Major cities, for example, do not have 
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electricity for up to 12 hours a day,72 roughly 40-55 million people do not have access to clean 
drinking water73 and much more. These crises are preventing people from investing in Pakistan’s 
economy. Although these are often seen as secondary issues after terrorism and Islamic 
extremism, scholars argue that this may be one of the biggest problems in Pakistan’s future. 
These social and economic issues could worsen and lead to a drastic future if Pakistan continues 
on its current path of “muddling through.”   Continuing with the status quo, therefore, may 
actually push Pakistan towards one of the other futures outlined by the CFR and the model.  
 Pakistan is currently experiencing a plethora of problems including, but not limited to, 
poverty, over-population, water shortages, climate instability, political instability, violence from 
internal sectarian terrorism, violence from separatist movements, violence by American drone 
attacks, economic instability, corruption, poor public education, energy crisis, threat of a military 
coup, health care, job security, food security, and no nation building efforts. All of these 
problems can be solved over time if scholars, policymakers and other stakeholders work in 
earnest to find solutions. I built the model to facilitate the understanding of the current problems 
facing Pakistan, and possibly opening a door for resolving them.   
  
                                                          
72
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Appendix A 
DPH Routines from the GPM   
Routine parameter Literal translation Implications 
routine 
'default_become_protest_condition' 
composite 
            code "    (angry and 
([DPH_sub]==2) and (rand < 
Mobilization_Factor(activated_identity))) 
or 
                                    (([DPH_act]==1) 
and ([DPH_sub]==2) and (rand < 
Group_Mobilization_Factor(activated_id
entity))) or 
                                    (([DPH_act]==0) 
and ([DPH_sub]==2) and (rand < 
((Group_Mobilization_Factor(activated_i
dentity)+AntiSystem_Bonus(activated_id
entity)))))" 
end 
If ‘angry’ and ‘DPH_ sub’ is 2 
(regime) and rand < 
‘Mobilizatoin_factor;’ or, if 
‘DPH_act’ is 1 (system) and 
DPH_sub’ is 2 (regime) and 
rand <  
‘Group_Mobilization_Factor;’ 
or if ‘DPH_act’ is 0 (non-
system) and ‘DPH_sub’ is 2 
(regime) and rand < 
‘Group_Mobilization_Factor’ 
plus ‘AntiSystem_Bonus;’ then 
‘default_become_protest’ 
condition occurs 
If any one of three sets of conditions are true: 
1)   The agent is angry, it is a regime-level 
agent, and a random selection is less than 
the mobilization factor 
2)   The agent is activated on a system-
level identity, it is a regime-level agent, 
and a random selection is less than the 
group mobilization factor 
3)   The agent is activated on a non-
system identity, it is a regime-level agent, 
and a random selection is less than the 
sum of the group mobilizatin factor and 
the anti-system bonus 
Then the agent is eligible for protest. 
 
routine 
'default_become_lobby_condition' 
composite 
 code "(angry and 
([DPH_sub]>2) and ((rand < 
Mobilization_Factor(activated_identity))) 
or (([DPH_act]==1) and ([DPH_sub]>2) 
and (rand < 
Group_Mobilization_Factor(activated_id
entity))) or (([DPH_act]==0) and 
([DPH_sub]>2) and (rand < 
((Group_Mobilization_Factor(activated_i
dentity)+AntiSystem_Bonus(activated_id
entity))))))" 
end 
If ‘angry’ and ‘DPH_ sub’ is  
greater than 2 (regime) and rand 
< ‘Mobilizatoin_factor;’ or, if 
‘DPH_act’ is 1 (system) and 
DPH_sub’ is greater than 2 
(regime) and rand <  
‘Group_Mobilization_Factor;’ 
or if ‘DPH_act’ is 0 (non-
system) and ‘DPH_sub’ is 
greater than 2 (regime) and rand 
< ‘Group_Mobilization_Factor’ 
plus ‘AntiSystem_Bonus;’ then 
‘default_become_lobby’ 
condition occurs 
If any one of three sets of conditions are true: 
1)   The agent is angry, it is an incumbent 
or dominant level agent, and a random 
selection is less than the mobilization 
factor 
2)   The agent is activated on a system-
level identity, it is an incumbent or 
dominant-level agent, and a random 
selection is less than the group 
mobilization factor 
3)   The agent is activated on a non-
system identity, it is an incumbent or 
dominant level agent, and a random 
selection is less than the sum of the group 
mobilizatin factor and the anti-system 
bonus 
Then the agent is eligible to lobby.  
remain_activated_condition rand < 3333 
-Refers to ‘remain_activated_condition’ keeps 
the identity the same when an agent becomes 
a protest agent   
-the rule allows 1/3 of the agents to become 
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protest agents  
activate_on_highest_condition (rand > 3333) and (rand < 6666) 
-activates the agent on the highest bias 
identity in the repertoire ; this happens to a 1/3 
of the agents who become protest agents  
randomize_activation_condition rand > 6666 
-activates the agent on a random identity in 
their repertoire; this happens to the final third 
of the agents who become protest agents.  
 
 
DPH Rules extracted from the GPM  
Rule Translation in PS-I  
rule 'system_attack' becomes 'system_attack' 
condition "[effect_code_marker]" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
attribute 'effect_code_marker' "0" 
end 
 
-if the agent’s effect code marker is true, then the agent 
angry value is part of your attributes, saves your 
previously activated identity  and their effect code marker 
becomes 0.  
rule 'system_attack' becomes 'basic' 
condition "true" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])"end 
 
-If the agent is activated on system attack, then the agent 
acquires the angry attribute and they activate on their 
previously activated identity  
-if your effect code marker is 0.  
rule 'system_victim' becomes 'system_victim' 
condition "[effect_code_marker]" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'effect_code_marker' "0" 
end 
 
If agent’s effect code marker indicates that the agent is a 
system victim agent, then the agent becomes angry and 
their effect code marker becomes 0.  
rule 'system_victim' becomes 'basic' 
condition "true" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
attribute 'Influence_level' "[Influence_level]-29" 
end 
If the agent is a system victim agent, then the agent 
becomes angry, activates on their previously activated 
identity and their influence level reduces by 29.  
rule 'protest' becomes 'basic' 
condition "true" 
attribute 'Influence_level' "[Influence_level]-
protest_influence" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If an agent is activated on protest, then their influence 
level decreases by the protest_influence value, the agent 
becomes angry and is activated on their previously 
activated identity.  
rule 'lobby' becomes 'basic' 
condition "true" 
If an agent is activated on lobby, then they acquire the 
angry attribute and activate on their previously activated 
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attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
identity.  
rule 'basic' becomes 'lobby' 
condition "default_become_lobby_condition and 
mobilized==0 and activate_on_highest_condition" 
attribute 'cache’ 
"repertoire(max_bias(subscription_set([cache]),1),[
cache])" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache]) end  
 
If an agent meets the ‘default_become_lobby condition’ 
(explicitly stating the rule than an agent may be activated 
on a non-system or system level identity but if it has an 
incumbent or a dominant level identity in it’s repertoire), 
then it is going to lobby; is mobilized on 0; and is 
activated on their highest condition, then they activate on 
the identity with the maximum bias in their repertoire, 
acquire the angry attribute and activate on their 
previously activated identity.  
Rule 'basic' becomes 'lobby' 
condition "default_become_lobby_condition and 
mobilized==0 and 
randomize_activation_condition" 
attribute 'cache’ 
"repertoire(random_element_hash(subscription_set
([cache]),hash(agent_x,agent_y,time,evolution_see
d)),[cache])" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If an agent meets the ‘default_become_lobby’ condition 
and is mobilized on 0, then they activate on a random 
identity in their repertoire,  acquire the angry attribute, 
and activate ontheir previously activated identity.  
rule 'basic' becomes 'lobby' 
condition "default_become_lobby_condition and 
mobilized==0 and remain_activated_condition" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If an agent meets the default become lobby condition, is 
not mobilized, then they remain activated on their current 
identity to lobby, acquire the angry attribute, and activate 
on their previously activated identity.  
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rule 'basic' becomes 'basic' 
condition "(cis(16) == 0) and oppressed_region 
and (military_presence>3)" 
attribute 'oppressed' "true" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If an agent is not subscribed on the military identity and 
surrounded by more than three military identities in the 
oppressed region, then they become oppressed, angry and 
activated on their previously activated identity.  
rule 'basic' becomes 'basic' 
condition "cis(16) or (military_presence<3)" 
attribute 'oppressed' "false" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If the agent is activated on the military identity or is 
surrounded by three or less military identities, then they 
are not oppressed, acquire the angry attribute and are 
their previously activated identity is saved.  
rule 'basic' becomes 'basic' 
condition "true" 
attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
attribute 'angry' "angry" 
end 
 
If the agent is basic, then they activate on their previously 
activated identity and acquire the angry attribute.  
 
rule 'basic' becomes 'protest' 
condition "default_become_protest_condition and 
mobilized==0 and activate_on_highest_condition" 
 attribute 'cache'
 "repertoire(max_bias(subscription_set([ca
che]),1),[cache])" 
 attribute 'Influence_level'  
If the ‘default_become_protest,’ ‘activate_on_highest’ 
and ‘mobilized=0’ conditions are satisfied, then the 
identity with the highest bias is selected, and the 
influence level of that agent increases from its current 
level as the ‘protest_influence’ value is added to agent 
influence’s influence level, and the ‘anger’ attribute is 
gained. 
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 "[Influence_level]+protest_influence" 
 attribute 'angry' "angry" 
 attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
rule 'basic' becomes 'protest' 
 condition 
"default_become_protest_condition and 
mobilized==0 and remain_activated_condition" 
 attribute 'Influence_level'  
   
 "[Influence_level]+protest_influence" 
 attribute 'angry' "angry" 
 attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
end 
 
If the ‘default_become_protest,’ ‘activate_on_highest’ 
and ‘mobilized=0’ conditions are satisfied, then the agent 
protests activated on its current identity, and the influence 
level of that agent increases from its current level as the 
‘protest_influence’ value is added to agent influence’s 
influence level, and the ‘anger’ attribute is gained. 
 
 
rule 'basic' becomes 'protest' 
 condition 
"default_become_protest_condition and 
mobilized==0 and 
randomize_activation_condition" 
 attribute 'cache'
 "repertoire(random_element_hash(subscri
ption_set([cache]),hash(agent_x,agent_y,time,evol
ution_seed)),[cache])" 
 attribute 'Influence_level'  
   
 "[Influence_level]+protest_influence" 
 attribute 'angry' "angry" 
 attribute 'prev_act' "activated([cache])" 
If the ‘default_become_protest,’ ‘activate_on_highest’ 
and ‘mobilized=0’ conditions are satisfied, then the agent 
protests activated on a random identity in its repertoire 
and, and the influence level of that agent increases from 
its current level as the ‘protest_influence’ value is added 
to agent influence’s influence level, and the ‘anger’ 
attribute is gained 
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end 
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Appendix B  
Experimentation Record and Log Notes 
Objective: To operationalize the five futures of Pakistan presented by the Council on Foreign 
Relations.   
Theory 1: Operationalizing regime change through observing the identity activation of the influential E 
agent. This is one possible way of representing a regime change because the influential E agent 
represents the most influential, far-reaching and powerful agent in the landscape. If the activated identity 
of the influential E changes, then that means the most powerful agent in the landscape has changed its 
affiliation and is leading with a different mindset. The underlying assumption behind this strategy is that 
the influential E operates differently from other agents. Rather than having one activated identity and 
multiple subscribed identities, influential E is a public figure of some sort, and thus its private life is 
politically inseparable from its private life. None of the other influential agents operate this way because 
even though they might be public figures, they could also be private bureaucrats or lower military ranks. 
In other words, there is no way to determine whether the remaining influential A, B, C or D agents are 
public figures or private figures and thus we can only treat influential E differently from the others. This 
means that the repertoire of influential E should contain only the identities that represent the identity 
most associated with the five futures. 
Date Experiment Experiment’s purpose Problems and 
modifications 
10/12/12 Today I added the 
“influential_seeding-pakistan.scp” 
folder so that the new 
virtualization model includes 
influentials A, B, C, D and E. 
Then I added a line in the GPM 
that allows me to track the 
Identity activation of influential E. 
I am now running the baseline 
100 times for 60 time steps each 
and tracking the Identity 
activation of influential E.   
Tracking the activation of 
influential E is important 
because the activation of 
influential E determines 
which type of 
government Pakistan is 
experiencing. If the 
influential E is activated 
on military, there is a 
coup occurring. If 
influential E is activated 
on the nationalist identit, 
it is a moderate state. If 
the influential E is on the 
PPP, then it is a state 
adrift; The other two 
futures -  Jihadi =Islamic 
and provincial =Punjabi  
PROBLEM; This 
model does not have 
properly seeded elite 
networks/influential 
agents.  Therefore, 
the influential E 
agent ONLY has the 
Urdu identity in it’s 
repertoire.  
SOLUTION: Seed 
all of the influential 
agents: A,B,C, D and 
E based on 
assumptions in books 
about Pakistan  
10/19/12  Today I Manually changed the 
repertoire of identity E to reflect 
-The five identities within 
influential E represent the 
PROBLEMS: 1)The 
listening rules are 
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the experiment listed above. The 
repertoire of identity E should 
now only include the PPP identity 
(A State adrift) , the military 
identity (Authoritarian) , the 
Jihadi identity (Extremist) , the 
Sunni Muslim Identity (Moderate 
government) and the Punjabi 
identity(secessionist);  
-QUESTION: Should I allow the 
Influential E to subscribe to and 
activate on other identities of not?  
Decision: set the cache as only 
these five identities and do not 
make the other identities 
unobtainable; in other words, if 
there are other identities that 
influential E wants to acquire, it 
can do this.  
 
-Once these changes were made, I 
ran the model for ten trials at 60 
time steps each to examine how 
frequently influential E’s 
activation would change. In this 
experiment, I am answering the 
question – does the rotation 
trigger for influential E need to be 
higher? 
 
I also wanted to track the 
activation of other influentials to 
avoid putting too much emphasis 
on influential E.  
five futures of Pakistan.  
-Tracking the activation 
of the influential E is 
important this week 
because the activation of 
influential E determines 
which type of 
government Pakistan is 
experiencing. If the 
influential E is activated 
on military, then a 
military coup is 
occurring.  
currently static, such 
that the identity 
activation of 
influential E has no 
impact on who the 
agent listens to more. 
This is a problem 
because if the 
influential E is 
activated on the 
military identity or 
the Punjabi identity, 
it maintains the same 
listening rules and 
elite networks.  
 
 
10/26/12 Today I Added a Punjabi 
identity (Secession) to the 
Influential E, ran the experiment 
forward for 60 time steps with 50 
runs to determine whether this is 
an effective way to measure the 
 PROBLEMS: 
Activation of Punjabi 
identity does not 
necessarily represent 
secession. Need to 
represent secession in 
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collapsed State future (hypothesis: 
it isn’t)  
2) Next step: Try to understand 
how those identities that do not 
have networks 
a different way.  
11/2/12 -The influential E now has the 
capability to change! But all 10 
runs gave the exact same results; I 
fixed this issue by adding a 
randomize_activation command  
 
Next time: Find other interesting 
ways besides the influential E to 
operationalize the five futures  
 
1. Added 
randomize_activation so 
that the different runs 
would produce different 
futures; this serves as a 
type of burn-in period for 
the model.  
1. No problems from 
this experiment 
 
 
 
Theory 2: Operationalization of the five futures of Pakistan needs to be something that internally arises 
out of the model, not something that I specifically implant into the model (such as the influential E). This 
changes the way I’ve currently been thinking about the parameters in the model. My influential E and 
elite networks will carry less weight than it has been in previous experiments. From now on, I will run the 
baseline with the most updated information possible and select specific metrics, such as identity 
activation, DPH level and political mobilization patterns, to test the futures.  
 
Date Experiment Experiment’s purpose Problems and 
modifications 
11/17 Run the baseline Test out best methods 
of data analysis by 
observing five futures 
in the model  
PROBLEM: Too many 
times the nationalist 
identity is dominant  
 
SOLUTION: VirPakv3 
snapshot created with 
nationalist identity *.4 
reduction with average of 
30% per region and 
randomized activation of 
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nationalist.  
-added a statistics column 
to measure intersection 
between elites and 5 
identities  
11/24 Run the baseline with 
changes to the 
nationalist identity 5 
times and carefully 
examine the data and 
the snapshots  
Test out best methods 
of data analysis by 
observing five futures 
in the model  
PROBLEM: SAME 
problem-- Too many times 
the nationalist identity is 
dominant in the model. In 
4 out of the 5 runs the 
nationalist identity was 
dominant in the last 10 
time steps.  
SOLUTION: VirPakv3 
snapshot created with 
nationalist identity *.3 
reduction with average of 
30% per region and 
randomized activation of 
nationalist.  
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Appendix C  
 
The following table shows where I found data for those identities that were not in the 1998 Census. These are all of 
the non-regional, non-religious and non-electoral identities. In the first version of Virtual Pakistan, the data was 
based on my best guess, but in this version, I used primarily the Asia Barometer Survey and the Islamic World 
Survey to support the inclusion of specific identities. I am still in the process of looking for the “socioeconomic 
data,” such as urban workers and peasants. All experiments conducted this semester exclude these socioeconomic 
identities.  
 
DATA COLLECTION  
 
Additional_identities-Pakistan.csv  
Identity Identity Definition Justification for 
Inclusion 
Source:  Data 
Nationalist An individual who 
readily identifies 
with a nation 
alongside or instead 
of other ethnic or 
religious identities.   
 
-Benedict 
Anderson: nation 
is an imagined 
community 
-People who 
support the 
nationalist 
Survey Question on Asia 
Barometer: “How proud 
of your nationality are 
you?” 
IN MODEL 
SCRIPT 
State An individual who 
works in the 
bureaucracy or 
supports the state 
apparatus 
(legislature, 
executive, 
bureaucracy)   
 
-State is real, 
nation is an idea 
(Mary Loyoun, 
Skocpol;)  
-People who want 
to preserve their 
own panel; 
Huntington also 
good 
-Look back to the 
constitution and 
determine  
Survey response to Asia 
Barometer question “I'm 
going to describe various 
types of political 
systems. Please indicate 
for each system whether 
you think it would be 
very good, fairly good or 
bad for this country?” 
 
IN MODEL 
SCRIPT  
Military An individual who 
either supports the 
military or is part of 
the military (may 
have a family 
member in the 
military)  
-Pakistani military 
has the propensity 
to stage coups and 
overthrow civilian 
government; 
clearly a key 
political actor  
Survey response to this 
question – “What are 
you thoughts on having a 
military government: 
would you trust military 
rule? “ 
IN MODEL 
SCRIPT  
Business Represents 
individuals and 
groups who are 
involved in the 
private sector.  
-Milton Freeman; I 
can make as many 
assumptions as I 
want as long as I 
understand the 
world better.  
Survey response to this 
question: “How would 
you place your views on 
this scale? 1 means you 
agree completely with 
the statement on the left; 
10 means you agree 
Include people who 
answered 1,2 or 3  
 
IN MODEL 
SCRIPT  
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-Business elites 
influence the 
politics of any 
civilian democratic 
society; they fund 
campaigns and 
often support 
under the table 
deals   
completely with the 
statement on the right; 
and if your views fall 
somewhere in between, 
you can choose any 
number in between.”  
 
 
Corruption/
Criminal 
Represents people 
and groups who are 
constantly 
attempting to 
undermine the 
nation’s legitimacy 
through under the 
table deals  
-  Do you think it’s 
justifiable for someone 
to accept a bribe (moadl) 
IN MODEL 
SCRIPT 
USA/Globa
lization 
Represents the 
people who support 
the expansion of the 
economy into 
foreign markets.  
 
Is Exposure to US 
culture harmful for your 
country? Counted those 
who disagree (asia 
barometer)  
No provincial data; 
only national data 
available, 10% to 
each province? Or 
2% for each 
province?  
Poor Represents overall 
poverty in the 
country  
Interesting to see 
which political 
party identities 
overlap with the 
poor identity and 
which other 
identities affect 
them.  
Go to thesis 
folder>Datacollection>P
overty_pg24 file on page 
24 shows statistics  
SPDC provided 
statistics: NWFP -
37%; FATA – 
60%; Punjab – 
31%; Sindh – 25%; 
Balochistan -34%; 
 
Urban 
Workers 
Represents urban 
poor citizens 
Different electoral 
behavior from 
poor agricultural – 
no landlord 
dictating voting 
patterns  
CONTINUE WITHOUT 
THIS DATA 
NOT IN 
CURRENT 
MODEL 
Landowner
/Feudal 
Represents 
agriculturally 
wealthy people  
Behave differently 
from urban 
wealthy – landlord 
dictating voting 
and other aspects 
of life 
CONTINUE WITHOUT 
THIS DATA 
NOT IN 
CURRENT 
MODEL  
Middle 
Class 
Urban  
Represents urban 
wealthier class  
Up and coming 
group which has 
traditionally led 
revolutions in 
other cases 
(Goldstone maybe) 
CONTINUE WITHOUT 
THIS DATA 
NOT IN 
CURRENT 
MODEL  
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Appendix D – ‘PakistanethnicregionCartogram.scp’ 
Script: GIS – Ethnic Region Cartogram  
Explanation: Apply_effect “landscape” selects an agent in the model identified by the parenthesis. After 
selecting that agent of the model, the agent acquires the ethnic number specified. For example, in agent 
8,87,8,87 is Baloch. The actual script continues for 200 pages and identifies the ethnic affiliation of every 
single agent. The GIS file streamlines the manual work that the modeler has to do.  
 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(8,87,8,87)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(15,111,15,111)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(16,92,16,92)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(16,110,16,110)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(17,109,17,109)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,108,18,108)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,109,18,109)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(19,108,19,108)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(20,94,20,94)" {"ethnic" "3"} 
Appendix E – ‘PakistanmajorcitiesCartogram.scp’ 
Script: GIS – Settlement Points  
Explanation: The Apply_effect “landscape” command selects the agent specified in the parenthesis and 
assigns the specified agent a settlement number. These settlement points assist the modeler in 
determining where influential agents should reside. The coding below is a small portion of the actual 
script demanded to complete this.  
 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(17,111,17,111)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "52"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(22,106,22,106)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "195"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(33,96,33,96)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "94"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(41,82,41,82)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "23"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(41,99,41,99)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "80"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(43,94,43,94)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "169"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(44,86,44,86)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "150"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(44,91,44,91)" {-1 "basic" "settlement" "197"} 
Appendix F – ‘PakistanwithpopulationCartogram.scp’  
Script: GIS- Admin 1 
Explanation: This script selects every agent and provides it with an admin 1 number. The admin 1 
number tells the agent which province they belong to. Admin 1 “2” in this case tells the agent it is part 
of the Balochi province.  
 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(8,87,8,87)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
Business 
??? 
Represents urban 
wealthiest class 
Behave differently 
from poor wealthy.  
CONTINUE WITHOUT 
THIS DATA  
NOT IN 
CURRENT 
MODEL  
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apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(11,89,11,89)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(15,111,15,111)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(16,110,16,110)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(17,109,17,109)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,108,18,108)" {-1 "basic" "admin1" "2"} 
 
Appendix G – ‘PakistanwithpopulationCartogram2.scp’  
Script: GIS- Admin 2 
Explanation: This script selects every agent and provides it with an admin 2 number. The admin 2 
number tells the agent which division they belong to.  
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(8,87,8,87)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "5"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(11,89,11,89)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "5"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(15,111,15,111)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(16,110,16,110)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(17,109,17,109)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,108,18,108)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "3"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,109,18,109)" {-1 "basic" "admin2" "3"} 
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Appendix H – ‘PakistanwithpopulationCartogram3.scp’ 
Script: GIS- Admin 3 
Explanation: This script selects every agent and provides it with an admin 3 number. The admin 3 
number tells the agent which district they belong to.  
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(8,87,8,87)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "24"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(11,89,11,89)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "24"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(15,111,15,111)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "17"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(16,110,16,110)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "17"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(17,109,17,109)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "18"} 
apply_effect "landscape" "rectangle(18,108,18,108)" {-1 "basic" "admin3" "18"} 
 
 
 
Glossary 
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Term Definition in PS-I 
Attribute A characteristic of an agent that changes the nature of its interactions. 
Agent A single unit in the model that represents approximately 40,000 people 
and engages in micro-interactions that have macro-effects.   
Agent class A group of agents with the same nature of interactions 
Agent-based modeling  A method of simulation that combines theories from game theory, 
evolution, complexity, sociology and more.  
 
Identity A fluid entity an agent associates with that can change at every time 
step.  
Influentials:  An agent with a higher influence level than a basic agent.  
Operationalization:  Translating a theory or idea from the real world into the agent-based 
model  
Parameter:  A variable that affects the behavior of the whole model  
Time step:  A created time interval used only in PS-I software 
Virtualization An agent-based model based on the information and behavior of a 
specific nation 
 
 
 
 
 
